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THE IMAGES OF HUMAN NATURE IN ECONOMICS
by
Katherine B. Freeman *
The views and assumptions regarding human nature through' 
history of economic thought have not always been explicidy stated or articu­
lated by the economists of the time. Often economists’ images of human 
nature and behavior must be put together from indirect statements and 
implicit assumptions. Even so, it is evident that various distinguishable 
images have existed throughout the history of economic thought, and the 
image has changed, although slowly and sometimes only subdy, over time. 
Thus, it can be argued that economists have generally recognized the need 
to at least implicidy define the behavioral and motivational characteristics of 
the individuals which they analyze even if the image is based simply on 
casual observations by the economist or, as often seems the case, represents 
his value judgments.
The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of the image of 
human nature in economics from the time of Adam Smith to the modern 
period. Many of the images closely resemble the “economic man” although 
some economists have had an altruistic or less than totally rational image. 
Modifications, qualifications, and shifts in emphasis from one economist to 
another serve to distinguish the images one from another and to focus 
attention on distinct aspects which were considered important.
Adam Smith: Sympathetic Self-interested Image
Adam Smith (1723-1790), the “father of modern economics”, first 
became well-known with the publication of The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
in 1759 in which he attempted to identify the sources of moral judgments. 
Although Smith viewed man as self-interested, he also viewed him as capa-
*  University of Denver, Department of Economics, Denver, CO (U.S.A.).
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ble of making moral judgments on the basis of considerations other than 
selfishness. This was brought about by the principle of sympathy — the 
ability to put oneself in the other person’s position.
How selfish soever man be supposed, there are evidently some principles in 
his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their 
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the 
pleasure of seeing it '.
Smith felt that we even sympathize with the dead by putting “our own 
living souls in their inanimated bodies, and thence conceiving what would 
be our emotions in this case” 1 2.
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith first introduced the notion 
of an “invisible hand”, and it is quite different from his later use of the term 
in The Wealth of Nations 3. He originally viewed the invisible hand as a 
natural and divine force which impels the rich to share their wealth with the 
poor.
[The rich] ... though they mean only their own convenience, though the sole 
end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they 
employ be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they 
divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by 
an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of 
life which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal 
portions among its inhabitants; and thus, without intending it, afford means 
to the multiplication of the species 4. [Italics mine]
Smith analyzed human conduct according to three sets of motives: 
self-love and sympathy; the desire to be free and a sense of propriety; the 
habit of labor and the propensity to exchange; each of which acted as a 
check and balance so that each person pursuing his own self-interest pro­
moted the public welfare. This was because Providence had made a society 
governed by natural order wherein the different motives of human behavior 
were balanced. Generally, then, Smith’s philosophy was very optimistic. 
When Smith applied his notions of natural order to the economic sphere, it 
is evident he is opposed to government intervention in the private sector, 
advocating instead a laissez-faire approach.
1 Smith (1976, p. 47).
2 Ibid., p. 53.
5 Smith (1937).
4 Smith (1976, p. 304).
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Some historians of economic thought tend to view the importance 
Smith placed on self-interest, productivity, and thriftiness in The Wealth of 
Nations as inconsistent with his emphasis on altruism in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. Thus Smith describes human nature in The Wealth of 
Nations:
The desire of bettering our conditions comes with us from the womb and 
never leaves us until we go to the grave ... Every individual is continuously 
exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever 
capital he can command ... There is a certain propensity to truck, barter, and 
exchange one thing for another 5.
According to this view, Smith laid the early foundation for the economic 
man. Moreover, Smith tried to justify the pursuit of self-interest by making 
it seem natural and by arguing that it promotes the public good -  the wealth 
of the nation -  so long as it is restrained by the invisible hand of com­
petition.
An individual neither intends to promote the public interest nor knows he is 
promoting it ... He intends only his own gain, and he is led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention ... It is not from 
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their self-interest. We address ourselves not 
to their humanity but to their self love, and never talk to them of our 
necessities, but of their advantages 6.
To reconcile the two doctrines, one could argue that Smith viewed 
individuals in both The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The ^Wealth of 
Nations as self-interested but that their self-interest is restricted in different 
ways. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, man s self-interest is curbed 
through sympathy. In The ^Wealth of Nations, self-interest is restrained by 
competition. Thus, both of Smith’s works reconciled the individual interest 
with the social interest through an invisible hand resulting in natural 
harmony.
Jeremy Bentham: Hedonistic Image
The contributions of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) are important in
’ Smith (1937, pp. 73, 324, 421).
6 Smith (1937, p. 421).
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the history of economic thought because he attempted to obtain a meas­
urement of social welfare employing the principle of utilitarianism — the 
greatest good for the greatest number. Thus an ethical limitation was im­
posed in that human conduct should result in the happiness of the greatest 
number. According to Bentham, mankind is governed solely by pain and 
pleasure, with self-interest as the main motive of human conduct.
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as 
well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right 
and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their 
throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every 
effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate 
and confirm i t7.
Bentham thought that pleasures and pains differed quantitatively but not 
qualitatively, and no pleasures were morally superior to others. In order to 
measure social welfare, Bentham used felicific calculus which involved a 
calculated balancing of pleasures and pains.
The emphasis of utilitarianism on the existence of subjective needs of 
individuals made evident a possible conflict with the requirements of the 
economic system since man’s primary goal was now the pursuit of pleasure 
and the avoidance of pain. Work involved pain, and that pain must now be 
weighed against the pleasures of the returns from work. Smith’s notion of 
rational, hard-working, and productive individuals must be modified to ac­
commodate the notion of perhaps irrational, human desires as the p r im a ry 
objective which could often be in conflict with the objectives of the market 
economy.
However, an ethical limitation was imposed in that human conduct 
should lead to the happiness of the greatest number. Thus, Bentham, like 
Smith, imposed limitations on the extent that man may harm his fellow man 
in the pursuit of his own self-interest.
David Ricardo: Heroic Capitalist Image
David Ricardo (1772-1823) was one of the first major political econo­
mists to place great emphasis on the analysis of the distribution of income 
rather than on production and the growth of income. Ricardo accepted the
7 Bentham (1948, p. 1).
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notion that individuals sought their own gain via Bentham’s notion of felicif- 
ic calculus of the measurement of pleasures and pains. He analyzed the 
distribution of income in terms of three economic classes -  landowners, 
capitalists, and laborers. Unlike Adam Smith, he did not envision a 
harmony of interests but rather opposing interests among the economic 
classes. In particular, he stated that “the interest of the landlord is always 
opposed to the interest of every other class in the community” 8. Landlords 
were not viewed as being especially productive, and they were always 
reaping that which they had not sown, thus diverting funds away from the 
productive industrial capitalists. Thus, rents and profits were viewed as 
being inversely related.
The capitalist tended to represent the “hero” of Ricardo’s analysis as 
Ricardo embraced Smith’s Protestant ethic orientation of individuals in his 
view of capitalists. Instead of regarding all individuals as economic men, the 
capitalist typified the Ricardian economic man, his primary motivation being 
to earn profits and reinvest them, thus leading to the economic progress of 
society.
Ricardo viewed workers as being condemned to a life of subsistence, 
their primary diversion being the pursuit of sexual pleasure resulting in 
more mouths to feed and eroding any increase in income they might have 
temporarily gained 9. It is apparent that Ricardo did not have a very high 
regard for the working class, and he felt that the Poor Laws only served to 
reinforce their undesirable characteristics.
The clear and direct tendency of the poor laws ... is not, as the legislature 
benevolently intended, to amend the condition of the poor, but to deteriorate 
the condition of both poor and rich ... The nature of the condition points out 
the remedy. By gradually contracting the sphere of the poor laws; by impress­
ing on the poor the value of independence, by teaching them that they must 
look not to systematic or casual charity, but to their own exertions for 
support, that prudence and forethought are neither unnecessary nor unprofita­
ble virtues, we shall by degrees approach a sounder and more healthful 
state 10.
At the same time, Ricardo was generous with his own wealth, complete­
ly supporting two almshouses at his own expense. Ricardo was rather 
pessimistic regarding the effectiveness of education in leading to greater
8 Ricardo (1926, p. 235).
9 Ricardo (1911, p. 53).
10 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
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prudence on the part of the laboring masses for he felt they were nonecono­
mic men ruled by emotion and were generally satisfied living at the subsist­
ence level. However, he felt that if workers could experience at least one 
generation of prosperity, they might become so accustomed to it that they 
would behave prudently thereafter.
John Stuart Mill: Liberal Humanitarian Image
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) felt that the analysis of human behavior 
was fundamental to “all reasoning in political and social affairs” 11. Mill 
viewed human nature as being governed by natural laws, and as such, 
remained constant over the course of time.
Men ... in a state of society are still men; their actions and passions are 
obedient to the laws of individual human nature. Men are not, when brought 
together, converted into another kind of substance, with different properties, 
as hydrogen and oxygen are different from water ... Human beings in society 
have no properties but those which are derived from ... the laws of nature of 
individual man 12.
Mill felt that government has a responsibility for encouraging indivi­
dual development. He stated that “a government cannot have too much of 
the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, indivi­
dual exertion and development”, and that precedence must be given to the 
“mental expansion and elevation” of individuals 13.
In his early twenties, Mill experienced a mental breakdown which he 
attributed in his Autobiography to a strong feeling of guilt in having ac­
cepted Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism. Afterward, Mill became very criti­
cal of various aspects of utilitarianism, particularly Bentham’s view that 
human behavior is entirely governed by self-interest. In fact, he went so far 
as to suggest that the reason Bentham ignored the importance of sympathy 
and altruism was because Bentham, himself, was lacking in these qualities14. 
The implication here is that Mill was not lacking in them, and this fact is 
supported by his great concern with income and wealth distribution and the 
possibilities for redistribution. Mill seemed to hold out hope that, in the 
stationary state, man would be more highly motivated to turn to altruistic
“  Mill (1888, p. 283).
12 Mill (1941, p. 573).
13 Mill (1956, pp. 140-141).
14 Mill (1950, pp. 61-63).
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concerns. Mill never totally abandoned the utilitarian principle, however, in 
that he continued to argue that the morality of human behavior should be 
judged by its effects on human happiness.
In general, then, Mill’s conception of human nature was liberal humani­
tarian. It was liberal in the sense of placing great importance on the indivi­
dual and on individual development and of viewing individual liberty as 
being of prime importance. It was humanitarian in the sense that Mill 
viewed man as being basically unselfish — if not in the present, at least in 
the future, when the stationary state will prevail. It is apparent from Mill s 
mental crisis that he agonized over the reconciliation of these two points of 
view. And many economists are still agonizing over this same problem 
today.
Karl Marx: Class-Conscious Image
Karl Marx (1818-1883) viewed man as being a product of the type of 
society in which he lived, and the type of society, in turn, was determined 
by the ownership of the means of production. In a more general sense, 
Marx viewed man as being a product of nature. Marx stated:
... the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these indivi­
duals and consequent relation to the rest of nature ... Men ... begin to 
distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their 
means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organiza­
tion. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing 
their actual material life 15.
Marx rejected the assumption of the economic man, and he argued that the 
classical economists’ image of man was based on the image of the bourgeois 
of their own day. Like Ricardo, Marx analyzed individuals in society accord­
ing to economic classes. Unlike Ricardo he did not view capitalists as 
heroic, and he did not treat landlords separately but lumped them with 
industrial capitalists in his analysis of conflict between capitalists and 
workers.
Marx’s analysis dealt with the laws of motion of society which deter­
mined social change. Marx viewed an individual s social, economic, political, 
and moral character as being determined by his economic class. The capital­
ist adopted the set of beliefs appropriate to his class position which would
15 Marx and Engels (1939, p. 7).
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serve to enhance that position. Marx repeatedly emphasized the acquisitive 
nature of capitalists. However, as capitalism advances, capitalists also begin 
to acquire a taste for consumer goods which tends to conflict with their 
desire for capital accumulation.
At the historical dawn of capitalist production — and every capitalist upstart 
has personally to go through this historical stage — avarice, and the desire to 
get rich, are ruling passions. But the progress of capitalist production not 
only creates a world of delights; it lays open, in speculation and the credit 
system, a thousand sources of sudden enrichment. When a certain stage of 
development has been reached, a conventional degree of prodigality, which is 
also an exhibition of wealth, and consequendy a source of credit, becomes a 
business necessity to the ‘unfortunate’ capitalist ... there is at the same time 
developed in his breast, a Faustian conflict between the passion for accumula­
tion, and the desire for enjoyment16.
The social character of workers was also determined by their class 
position. Workers were the victims of a system that dulled their emotions 
and intellect. Marx was strongly opposed to the view that workers were 
condemned to a life of subsistence because of their sexual reproductive 
drive, calling it a libel on the human race. Workers would ultimately adopt 
the ideology of Marxism as the contradictions inherent in capitalism became 
apparent to them. For full class consciousness to be realized on the part of 
workers, it was necessary for them to realize how different their interests 
were from those of capitalists. Marx felt that the proletariat often suffered 
from a false class consciousness which caused them to identify with and ally 
themselves to capitalists. However, business cycle crises served to i llu m in ate  
and intensify the class distinctions, resulting in an inevitable class struggle 
leading to historical change and to changes in the mode of production which 
would impact all of human culture.
After the emergence of socialistic societies, the relationships among 
individuals would become mutually satisfying. Moreover, individuals would 
be able to derive satisfaction, rather than being alienated from, their work 
and the products of their labor.
Assuming that we were producers as human beings (not as commodity pro­
ducers), each of us would then have doubly asserted himself and others 
through his production ... My own true being and essence would be con­
firmed and embodied in my individual activity. Our products would then be 
so many mirrors from which our being would shine out to us ... 17.
16 Marx (1906, pp. 650-51).
17 Marx (1932, p. 106).
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Alfred Marshall: Rational Economic Image
Alfred Marshall (1848-1924) shifted the emphasis back to economic 
rationality as both an ideal and the ultimate result of the operation of 
economic laws. He viewed economics as the study of man in the ordinary 
business of life. The rational, calculating, and competitive economic man 
again dominated economic thinking.
Marshall was greatly interested in human character growth which he 
thought resulted from greater economic independence and competitiveness. 
An individual’s character is shaped by the way he earns his income as well 
as by how much he earns.
For the business by which a person earns his livelihood generally fills his 
thoughts during the greater part of those hours in which his mind is at its 
best; during them his character is being formed by the way in which he uses 
his faculties in his work, by the thoughts and feelings which it suggests, and 
by his relation to his associates in work, his employers or his employees ... 
And very often the influence exerted on a person’s character by the amount 
of his income is hardly less, if it is less, than that exerted by the way in which 
it is earned ... the conditions which surround extreme poverty ... tend to 
deaden the higher faculties 18.
Marshall argued that while altruistic behavior would be beneficial, it is 
unrealistic to assume individuals behave in this manner.
Such is the golden age to which poets and dreamers may look forward. But in 
the responsible conduct of affairs, it is worse that folly to ignore the imperfec­
tions which still cling to human nature. History in general, and especially the 
history of socialistic ventures, shows that ordinary men are seldom capable of 
pure ideal altruism for any considerable time together 19.
Thus, individuals are basically deliberate and competitive which not only 
made individuals better off but resulted in benefits for the economy as a 
whole. Marshall placed great emphasis on individual freedom because he 
felt that the more freedom an individual had, the more rational he would 
become.
It is interesting that in spite of his emphasis on individualism, rationa­
lism, and competition, Marshall viewed himself as being oriented toward
18 Marshall (1920, pp. 1-2).
19 Ibid., p. 9.
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humanitarian concerns. According to Marshall, the problems of poverty in 
Britain were the impetus behind his work.
I think I should perhaps say that I have devoted myself for the last twenty- 
five years to the problem of poverty, and that very little of my work has been 
devoted to any inquiry which does not bear on that20.
Nevertheless, Marshall is not really remembered primarily for contributions 
dealing with humanitarian issues except in the sense that he was concerned 
with economic growth which often results in benefits for individuals on all 
levels of the economic ladder.
Thorstein Veblen: Institutional Image
Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929), viewing man within the broader frame­
work of anthropology and biology, rejected the assumption that human 
behavior is rational within the economic sphere. To begin with, Veblen 
denied the validity of the hedonistic conception of man as one able to 
calculate the gains and losses associated with alternative choices available 
to him. Veblen viewed human action as more instinctive than reflective. 
According to Veblen it is necessary to view human behavior within a 
dynamic institutional framework. A conflict exists between dynamic and 
static influences on human behavior resulting in an evolutionary individual.
Not only is the individual’s conduct hedged about and directed by his habit­
ual relations to his fellows in the group, but these relations being of an 
institutional character, vary as the institutional scene varies. The wants and 
the desires, the end and the aim, the ways and the means, the amplitude and 
drift of the individual’s conduct are functions of an institutional variable that 
is of a highly complex and wholly unstable character21.
Two psychological drives were important in human behavior — the 
instinct of workmanship and the instinct of emulation. Man had a natural 
drive to be productive and innovative and engineers would seek to devise 
methods of production to produce unlimited amounts of output, but big 
business suppressed output below its technically feasible level through insti­
tutionalized waste.
20 Marshall (1926, p. 205).
21 Veblen (1961, p. 165).
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Veblen viewed the individual’s consumption patterns as being affected 
by the consumption patterns of society’s wealthy leisure class which the 
consumer wished to emulate.
The effect upon the serious activities of man is therefore to direct them with 
great singleness of purpose to the largest possible acquisition of wealth, and 
to discountenance work that brings no pecuniary gain 22.
Thus the individual engages in “conspicuous consumption”, but this consump­
tion does not satisfy his needs because it forces him to concentrate almost 
exclusively on activities which bring monetary rewards to the exclusion of 
other concerns.
John Kenneth Galbraith: Affluent Irrational Image
John Kenneth Galbraith (1908- ) in his important work, The Af­
fluent Society, also rejects the concept of the rational economic man. 
However, instead of individuals emulating the consumption patterns of the 
rich, their consumption patterns are manipulated by advertising and sales­
manship which serve to create their wants.
As a society becomes increasingly affluent, wants are increasingly created by 
the process by which they are satisfied. This may operate passively. Increases 
in consumption, the counterpart to increases in production, act by suggestion 
or emulation to create wants 23.
Thus, according to Galbraith, the consumer is not sovereign but is manipu­
lated by producers into new and artificial wants which satisfy the goals of 
producers in what Galbraith refers to as the dependence effect. Moreover, 
Galbraith states that welfare may not be increased as output increases since 
more output only serves to create more wants.
Wants thus come to depend on output. In technical terms it can no longer be 
assumed that welfare is greater at an all-around higher level of production 
than at a lower one. It may be the same. The higher level of production has, 
merely, a higher level of want creation necessitating a higher level of want 
satisfaction 24.
22 Veblen (1934, p. 112).
23 G albraith (1969, p. 158).
24 Ibid.
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Galbraith states that the affluence of consumers facilitates the implementa­
tion of the dependence effect.
The further a man is removed from physical need the more open he is to 
persuasion — or management — as to what he buys. That is, perhaps, the most 
important consequence for economics of increasing affluence 25.
Thus, the irrational individual not only abandons his consumer sovereignty 
but is not necessarily happier as a result, because the greater his income, the 
greater are his wants which must be satisfied.
Summary and Conclusions
We began with Adam Smith’s sympathetic self-interested image. Smith 
viewed man as being, by nature, self-interested. Man was also oriented 
toward hard work in production, and he was thrifty for the purpose of 
capital accumulation because of his innate desire for bettering his condition. 
At the same time, man was sympathetic toward his fellow men because his 
imagination enabled him to conceptualize others’ feelings. For this reason, 
man was able to hold his self-interest in check especially in those instances 
where he would gain only at the expense of harming others.
Then Jeremy Bentham arrived on the economic scene with his hedonis­
tic image and the doctrine of utilitarianism. Here the emphasis was on 
entirely subjective desires originating within the individual. Man’s primary 
goal was the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Man did not 
necessarily enjoy working, and the desire for bettering his condition must 
now be weighed against the pain of work. There was little emphasis on 
objective rationality on the part of the individual as he pursued his pleas­
ures, and much more emphasis was placed on subjective desires.
David Ricardo accepted Bentham’s hedonistic philosophy of man, but 
he had separate images according to economic class. He embraced Adam 
Smith’s Protestant ethic orientation in his view of capitalists. The capitalist 
was a heroic figure to Ricardo because of his desire to accumulate and 
reinvest capital leading to economic growth. The worker, on the other hand, 
seemed to Ricardo to be condemned to subsistence as a result of his reprod­
uctive drive. The landlords sat back and benefitted from the hard work and 
thrift of capitalists and the sex drive of workers. Ricardo placed little empha­
21 Galbraith (1967, p. 46).
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sis on altruism. His main concern regarding help for the poor was that any 
charity would lead to an even further deterioration of their character.
John Stuart Mill was concerned not only with what man was but also 
with what man could be. While he felt man’s basic nature was determined 
by natural law, Mill was concerned that man’s development would be im­
paired by conforming to the constraints of society. Mill wanted the greatest 
possible freedom for individual development. At the same time, Mill was 
greatly concerned over humanitarian issues, and he denied Bentham’s view 
that man was basically self-interested.
To Karl Marx, man was a product of the type of society in which he 
lived, and the type of society was determined by who owned the means or 
production. Like Ricardo, Marx felt that man would identify with his eco­
nomic class. However, unlike Ricardo, he did not view capitalists as heroic. 
Moreover, any character defects of workers resulted from their being the 
victims of a system that dulled their emotions and intellect. The relationship 
between the classes under the capitalist system would always be one of 
conflict. But this would change to a relationship of solidarity under so­
cialism.
Alfred Marshall, in his view of man, shifted the emphasis from the 
satisfaction of purely subjective desires of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism 
back to the satisfaction of objective, economic desires, giving us the rational 
economic man. Man was viewed as totally rational and calculating as well as 
competitive. These characteristics not only made individuals better off ac­
cording to Marshall but also promoted the interests of society.
Thorstein Veblen rejected the notion that human economic behavior 
was rational. Consumer behavior was based on habit and on an attempt to 
emulate the consumption patterns of the wealthy class. Even then, the 
individual did not gain satisfaction because his desire to engage in conspic­
uous consumption forced him to concentrate almost exclusively on activi­
ties which brought monetary rewards to the exclusion of other concerns.
John Kenneth Galbraith places great emphasis on the irrationality of 
man and his lack of sovereignty as a consumer. Because man’s basic needs 
are already satisfied in an affluent society, new needs must be created for 
him by producers. In the affluent society, man is lured to the pursuit of 
what others have convinced him will bring him pleasure, and this dominates 
other rational considerations.
Having examined the various images of man throughout the history of 
economic thought, several important points emerge. First, every economist 
examined generally had some image of human behavior which incorporated 
certain behavioral and motivational characteristics. Economists derived their
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images from two primary sources. One source was simply casual observa­
tions of human economic behavior on the part of the economist. Another 
important source were the value judgments of the economist regarding how 
man should be. Often these two sources were so intertwined that econo­
mists did not really make a distinction between what man should be and 
what man actually was. Finally, in order to justify their images of man, 
economists would often try to link up their images with what they termed 
laws of human nature which they were generally unable to adequately 
define.
The image of man that ultimately emerged from the history of econom­
ic thought and the one that the majority of economists currently subscribe 
to is that of the economic man. Although some of the earlier economists 
such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill focused attention on the possibili­
ties of non-self-interested behavior on the part of individuals, the most 
prevalent image has been that of the self-interested individual. Another 
prominent aspect associated with the image of man throughout the history 
of economic thought is that of rationality. Incorporated into the concept of 
rationality was the idea of striving for maximum satisfaction through the 
attainment of economic rewards with minimum sacrifice and effort. Jeremy 
Bentham seemed to offer a challenge to this emphasis on rational objective 
behavior, but his challenge was counterbalanced by the influence of Alfred 
Marshall. The works of Thorstein Veblen and John Galbraith, as well as 
several other recent economists, have also attempted to challenge the as­
sumption of rationality, but their contributions have not been generally 
incorporated into the mainstream of economics.
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L’IMMAGINE DELLA NATURA UMANA NELLA SCIENZA ECONOMICA
Questo articolo si propone di tracciare l’evoluzione dell’immagine della 
natura umana in economia dai tempi di Adam Smith sino ai tempi moderni. 
Sebbene gli economisti non abbiano sempre articolato esplicitamente la loro 
immagine della natura e comportamento umani, purtuttavia affermazioni indiret­
te e ipotesi implicite indicano che sono esistite e si sono evolute nel tempo diver­
se distinte immagini della natura umana. Spesso le caratteristiche comportamenta­
li e motivazionali sembrano basarsi su osservazioni casuali degli economisti o 
rappresentare i loro giudizi di valore. Molte immagini somigliano moltissimo 
all’“homo oeconomicus” benché alcuni economisti abbiano avuto immagini di 
natura umana altruistica o non del tutto razionale. Vengono esaminate tutte.
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INDIVIDUALISMO METODOLOGICO, 
MERCATO COSTITUZIONALE E « LA VIA BREVE » 
DELLA COSTITUZIONE SENZA COSTITUENTI
di
G iuseppe E usepi *
1. È  opinione dell’autore che l’attuale stato della teoria, e a m a g g io r  
ragione della pratica costitu2Ìonale, abbia perduto quell’attrazione intellettua­
le non conservatrice e non di maniera che aveva caratterizzato gli anni ’60 e 
gli inizi degli anni 70 . Questo lavoro cercherà di individuare i motivi di 
questo « stop al crocevia » suggerendo due ipotesi interpretative. La prima è 
il peso eccessivo che, almeno per una quindicina di anni dopo la sua pubbli­
cazione, ha avuto il libro di Rawls * 1 e la conseguente sottoutilizzazione 
concettuale delle implicazioni, neppure molto implicite, che si sarebbero 
potute trarre dagli apporti analitici di Cost and Choice 2.
Ho cercato di mostrare altrove 3 come Buchanan sia ritornato a svilup­
pare il tema di Cost and Choice esattamente venti anni dopo estendendo alla 
Costituzione l’individualismo metodologico, completandolo con una defini­
zione di regola costituzionale in termini di assoluto relativo o assoluto 
relativamente assoluto. Più avanti affronterò le implicazioni prospettiche di 
questo concetto; mi si consenta per iniziare qualche osservazione in retro­
spettiva.
Ci si può porre un interrogativo. È  storicamente esistito un assolutismo 
assolutamente assoluto? Com’è noto, questo era l’obiettivo politico dell’asso­
lutismo; il contributo di Buchanan può fornire una qualche utilità anche dal 
punto di vista della comprensione teorica retrospettiva di quel periodo, se 
cioè quell’obiettivo fu o meno raggiunto e perfino se esso sia concettualmen-




3 E usepi (1991a e 1991c).
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te prospettabile. Sembra che si debba rispondere negativamente. Il primo e 
piu importante punto da osservare è che l’assolutismo non era conciliabile — 
neppure per i contemporanei — con l’attribuzione di un potere assoluto alla 
persona del re. Fu proprio per questo motivo che venne introdotta la distin­
zione tra re e corona o tra rex e regnum. La corona serviva a costituire la 
continuità della dinastia in caso di vacatio dovuta alla morte del re, ma 
serviva anche a costituire la necessaria continuità del potere nei periodi di 
assenza del re dal trono dovuta alle guerre. Dunque, il re, pur proclamato 
legibus solutus non era il depositario prò tempore di un potere illimitato 
quanto il capo indiscusso di una burocrazia piramidale, attraverso la quale, 
egli in definitiva poteva esercitare il potere.
Perfino quando, con un’evidente esagerazione Luigi XIV affermava 
l’état c’est moi, tale potere apparteneva piuttosto al re, solo in quanto capo di 
un’organizzazione di intendenti che fungevano da agenti di un principale i 
cui interessi collidevano fortemente con quelli della nobiltà terriera locale. 
Dunque, perfino l’assolutismo non fu cosi assoluto, non fu una personifica­
zione del potere, ma il prevalere di una struttura burocratica, gerarchica che 
non godeva di diritti formali ma che non escludeva affatto che avesse un suo 
proprio potere. L ’assolutismo fu in realtà uno stato a stati ma mai un blocco 
omogeneo privo di conflittualità. È appena il caso di notare che quando vi è 
conflittualità ogni contesto diventa provvisorio ex ante e, quindi, ogni assolu­
to si trasforma di necessità in relativo. Un secondo aspetto merita di essere 
segnalato perché funzionale al nostro discorso ed è che anche nell’assoluti­
smo vi era una costituzione sostanziale e che quindi quando i movimenti 
liberali del XVIII e X IX  secolo a partire dai rivoluzionari americani a quelli 
francesi lottavano per « la costituzione », non lottavano in realtà per una 
costituzione tout-court ma per una costituzione diversa che desse le necessa­
rie garanzie di libertà. Questo aspetto mostra che con l’etichetta di costituzio­
nalismo può designarsi tutto e il contrario di tutto. Da qui la rilevanza della 
qualificazione « contrattualistica » che designa una particolare visione della 
costituzione che è importante in quanto si basa sul consenso e non perché 
venga semplicemente subita 4.
Vi è un elemento distintivo per il quale il costituzionalismo è contrat­
tualistico rispetto al costituzionalismo come indifferenziato punto di parten­
4 Una costituzione universale è ovviamente postulata anche da San Tommaso, il quale, in 
riferimento al mondo terreno che qui ci interessa, si rivolge al principe come a colui che è 
incaricato di una collettività e non da una collettività e aggiunge che nonostante vi siano delle 
leggi tiranniche l'osservarle rende buoni. La logica che sta dietro a queste espressioni rimanda a 
una monarchia assoluta che ha Dio come archetipo e in questo senso costituisce l’unico 
assolutamente assoluto.
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za; vi è cioè un dualismo ineliminabile tra il consenso espresso dalla « ragio­
ne universale » e il consenso espresso tramite il contratto. I due elementi 
che si trovano spesso indifferenziati nei primi filosofi della democrazia e che 
non rendono sempre agevole l’interpretazione potrebbero essere separati 
partendo rispettivamente dalla posizione di Rousseau del contratto sociale 
rispetto alla posizione di Kant ovvero del contratto politico. Mentre dalla 
posizione di Rousseau il consenso genuino è quello della volontà generale 
che è geneticamente diversa in quanto obbedisce a un canone superiore 
rispetto alla volontà di tutti e che ha come risultato una normativa che 
trascende i contraenti potenziali, il contratto di cui parla Kant e il conseguen­
te consenso che ne discende non rinvia ad una universalità della ragione che 
sia del tutto esterna agli individui; rimanda invece ad una razionalità relativa 
che si risolve nella volontà della maggioranza che non ha nulla di assoluto in 
quanto il risultato di volontà di individui diversi che convengono su un 
certo numero di norme -  valori -  ma che rimangono tra loro diversi. In 
sostanza, la volontà generale o la razionalità universale costituiscono il pre­
supposto per una sorta di decisore di ultima istanza, infallibile, superiore e 
che, in quanto tale, si sottrae ai normali controlli della giustizia costitu­
zionale.
Quest’approccio è alternativo a quello contrattuale il cui elemento di­
stintivo è quello del limite ed è vincolante nella misura in cui il limite sia 
rinegoziabile, il che preclude che non si trasformi in assoluto neppure in via 
di fatto. Per questa via la permanenza del nocciolo costituzionale o grundnor- 
men nel senso di Kelsen, non costituisce l’equivalente della volontà generale 
ma il permanere o la riconferma del consenso espresso. Di conseguenza, la 
stabilità risulta ex ante a tempo indeterminato, non risulta, invece, ex ante 
non rinegoziabile come avviene nel caso della volontà generale. Ciò non può 
sorprendere, dal momento che la volontà generale non è interessata al con­
senso degli individui ma alla determinazione di obiettivi la cui validità 
prescinde del tutto dalla valutazione individuale; non si tratta qui della 
fissazione di processi che risultano in qualche modo neutri rispetto agli 
obiettivi, si tratta, invece, della fissazione degli obiettivi assumendo che i 
processi decisionali siano irrilevanti. È  ovvio, quindi, che il risultato della 
volontà generale sfoci nella pianificazione economica laddove il contrattuali­
smo, genuinamente individualistico, non è interessato alla fissazione di obiet­
tivi che rimangono di competenza degli individui; esso è interessato alla 
fissazione di regole tali da rendere quegli obiettivi mutuamente compatibili 
ex ante. Ciò è possibile solo a condizione che il mercato costituzionale sia un 
mercato libero. Ma un mercato libero non è un mercato senza regole: è un 
mercato senza divieti d’ingresso ed è un mercato in cui sia esplicito che il
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mantenimento di regole è un elemento meritorio dal momento che i governi 
sono interessati, in assenza di costituzione fiscale vincolante, a violare quelle 
regole che eventualmente non fossero esplicite.
Questo lavoro, quindi, cercherà in primo luogo di estendere l’individua­
lismo metodologico al gioco costituzionale recuperando per questa via la 
motivazione individuale alla partecipazione al gioco che risulta confinata in 
un mondo in cui l’individuo rischiava, come nell’analisi Rawlsiana, di non 
avere un posto e, quindi, un interesse a partecipare. La seconda ragione 
dello « stop al crocevia » è probabilmente la scarsa attenzione dedicata alle 
istituzioni reali dei singoli paesi5 : da questo secondo punto di vista il 
modello non serve a spiegare il passaggio anarchia-ordine, inefficienza-effi­
cienza, ma quale ordine alternativo è possibile a partire dalle istituzioni 
presenti intese come valori non assoluti e non necessariamente o comunque 
non più condivisi dagli individui o dai loro rappresentanti in Parlamento. Gli 
individui e i rappresentanti, quando i valori istituzionali sono, o sembra che 
siano vincoli adoperare anziché limite per operare, non necessariamente 
hanno lo stesso ruolo anche se entrambi potrebbero accordarsi nel senso 
della difesa ad oltranza dello status quo attuando, quindi, un comportamento 
strategico consentito dalla sistematica e lenta erosione delle regole costituzio­
nali a danno delle generazioni future. In questo senso, la Costituzione scritta 
diventa altra cosa dalla Costituzione in atto e, a meno che non si prendano 
provvedimenti tesi ad introdurre la logica costituzionale nel modello di 
comportamento prevalente del mercato politico adottando il modello « a due 
livelli », la Costituzione si trasforma in un ideale che serve semplicemente a 
rendere permanente e definitivo lo status quo: il contrattualismo concettuale 
che è alla base del costituzionalismo democratico scompare e con esso l’indi­
viduo come unità decisionale. A questo punto la Costituzione diventa affare 
di pochi e il mercato politico non trova più limiti o argini e si trasforma in 
un oligopolio tirannico.
Il dibattito che ha luogo da alcuni anni in Italia può costituire il punto 
di partenza per il superamento dello iatus tra la teoria che è divenuta forse 
troppo astratta e il mercato politico che è diventato troppo miope o troppo 
monopolistico o collusivo e non disposto a correre il « rischio del cambia­
mento ». Mostrare che questo iatus è il risultato dovuto al disinteresse che il 
mercato politico è riuscito a creare attorno alle istituzioni è imo dei risultati 
di questo lavoro.
’ Francesco Forte ha mostrato i diversi significati di giustizia e i diversi significati di 
tassazione ottima che emergono a livello CEE. Questo modo di procedere è in prospettiva 
molto promettente anche dal punto di vista teorico. Per i problemi connessi all’armonizzazione 
nel contesto giustizia-tassazione ottima cfr. Forte (1990, specialmente il capitolo 2).
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2. Dal punto di vista teorico, l’assunto dell 'homo oeconomicus -  interes­
sato com’è esclusivamente al calcolo delle utilità proprie espresse in unità 
monetarie — è apparso eccessivo 6; ciascuno, in qualche modo, tiene conto 
anche degli altri specialmente se intesi come controparte di un contratto 
concettuale e ciò perché nel suo calcolo interno diventa rilevante la reazione 
attesa della controparte o anche perché l’atto gli procura un piacere che gli 
deriva dal riconoscimento esterno 7. Chiaramente in questo caso esistono 
effetti esterni positivi per i fruitori mentre i costi privati non hanno contro- 
partita in flussi monetari o in contropartite fiscali.
In linea di principio, la decisione privata potrebbe anche tener conto 
degli effetti sui terzi, che per definizione sono estranei al contratto; ciò, 
naturalmente, non significa che la valutazione che ha luogo in questo caso, 
prima che la decisione venga assunta, costituisca il surrogato della valutazio­
ne dei terzi. Rigorosamente parlando, infatti, i terzi non possono entrare 
nella valutazione di A in termini di suoi costi di opportunità surrogati di B: 
si tratta, infatti, delle valutazioni di A circa la reazione che B avrà di fronte a 
una sua scelta; ma ciò, in quanto previsione di A, costituisce il costo atteso 
da A e, sotto questo profilo, incide sulla sua scelta. Rimane comunque il 
fatto che questi costi attesi di A su B non possono essere quelli di B, anche 
per il fatto che, ex ante, le informazioni di B sulle scelte di A sono necessaria­
mente minori e probabilmente sono vicine allo zero in assenza di regole, 
rispetto a quelle di A che sceglie. L ’opposto discorso vale ovviamente nel 
caso che a scegliere sia B.
Il semplice modello relazionale A-B non suggerisce — o almeno non 
sembra suggerire necessariamente — l’impossibilità di calcolare il costo, indi­
ca invece la necessità di eliminare dal gioco il contesto da dilemma del 
prigioniero, il quale effettivamente rende le previsioni soggettive ragionevol­
mente impossibili. L ’introduzione di regole fornisce informazioni ad entram­
bi i giocatori rendendo le loro scelte reciprocamente meno rischiose e, quin­
di, piu efficienti e ciò non contraddice il fatto che la scelta dei singoli 
giocatori deve mantenere la propria libertà e, quindi, in qualche modo la 
propria erraticità. La necessità della regola costituzionale come regola relati­
vamente assoluta serve ad evitare, nel maggior grado possibile, tutte le 
illusioni finanziarie e monetarie che rendono il contesto di scelta di A un
6 Cfr. E usepi (1991a) e la letteratura ivi citata, specialmente Knight (1928, 1934 e 1935). 
Per un contributo teorico pure in chiave soggettivistica delle argomentazioni svolte nel testo 
cfr. Forte (1973 e soprattutto 1991), specialmente la critica a Parfit (1986) a cui si fa 
riferimento anche più oltre nel testo.
7 È  questo probabilmente un punto chiave per la diffusione del volontariato che trova 
spiegazioni parziali o ideologiche se si fa ricorso a valori assoluti.
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atto mentale illusorio giungendo perfino a nullificare il valore conoscitivo 
del consenso 8.
A livello di scelta costituzionale e nella logica delle riforme costituziona­
li che qui interessa vi sono i valori comuni che ispirano l’ordinamento o 
sistema sociale esistente 9. Non si tratta, quindi, come opportunamente sug­
gerisce Forte di « tutti i valori » 10 ma solo di quelli che costituiscono, per 
cosi dire, il denominatore comune, intesi come regola del confronto. Tale 
regola è costituzionale non nel senso che definisce un valore assoluto come il 
valore della giustizia in sé, ma la procedura, uguale per tutti, per la giustizia, 
la quale in quanto finisce con l’essere il risultato, può variare, dipendendo 
da decisioni interne e, quindi, successive a quella della regola fondamentale.
In sostanza, il processo tende a definire l’uguaglianza del cittadino di 
fronte alla regola, e cioè fissa l’impossibilità di crearsi una propria regola o 
una regola nella regola.
3. Il problema presentato sopra non esclude che ogni cittadino possa 
avere un peso diverso nella riforma della regola; in questo caso il vincolo 
costituzionale rimane ma il fitto velo di Rawls si trasformerebbe in « male 
pubblico » in quanto ridurrebbe la regola costituzionale ad un astratto esperi­
mento mentale in cui il connotato empirico, indispensabile nella teoria della 
conoscenza kantiana, cade e la conoscenza di Rawls diventa un prodotto 
della logica pura o della ragione pura che manca dei requisiti della conoscen­
za kantiana 11. Se il velo di Rawls è fitto emergerà nelle riforme costituziona- 
li-istituzionali il problema del libero battitore, poiché ex ante diviene chiaro 
all’individuo che è possibile ricevere i benefici -  in quanto sono uguali per 
tutti — senza sopportare il costo della negoziazione. Da qui la regola di 
Rawls diventa indifferente agli individui e, quindi, il loro coinvolgimento 
nelle riforme comporta ex ante un costo di cui non potranno essere compen­
sati a livello post costituzionale.
8 A tutt’oggi la trattazione piu straordinaria di questa tematica appartiene a Puviani (1972, 
1973 e da ultimo 1975). Su questo punto vedi Forte e Mossetto (a cura di) (1972, Sez. Ili), 
Buchanan (1960) e il mio articolo (Eusepi, 1989, specialmente paragrafi 5-7).
9 Su questo punto cfr. Crisafulli (1970), il quale però intende come ordinamento un 
qualcosa di assolutamente assoluto. La tesi svolta nel testo rimanda perciò a Kelsen (1960) che 
costituisce la versione kantiana piu lineare e differisce sostanzialmente, almeno a mio avviso, 
dalla posizione di Rawls.
10 La posizione di Forte della non esaustività dei valori costituzionali serve a mantenere al 
mercato politico i valori che chiamerei secondari, elemento questo rilevante e che distingue o 
dovrebbe distinguere il mercato politico dal mercato economico. Cfr. anche Sen (1982).
1 ' Si noti che per Kant, diversamente da Hegel, non vale il detto spinoziano « exentia 
ìnvolvit existentiam »; pensare e conoscere sono attività diverse: la conoscenza prevede necessa­
riamente l’elemento extra-logico, cioè l’elemento empirico.
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Problemi perfino piu seri di quelli di Rawls emergono se si parte 
dall’analisi di P arfit12. Nel suo caso, infatti, l’ex ante costituzionale e perfino 
l’ex ante post costituzionale è difficilmente pensabile in quanto vi sono 
relazioni tra io diversi in tempi diversi e non due livelli decisionali diversi di 
un io che, in qualche modo, si determina come flusso di coscienza di sé. Qui 
non si discute in linea di principio che il legame degli interessi che avranno 
luogo in un futuro lontano rispetto all’io che decide qui ed ora possa atte­
nuarsi (sperimentalmente ciò si potrebbe descrivere con un tasso d interesse 
che nel lungo periodo tende a zero anziché aumentare) e non si discute 
neppure -  e questo in modo più convinto anche perché contraddice forte­
mente l’assunto precedente — che esiste una maggiore consapevolezza della 
stabilità delle sensazioni presenti non ultimo per il fatto che le valutazioni 
presumibilmente variano. Il punto è che la variazione delle valutazioni non e 
imputabile all’esistenza di tanti io temporali ma ad un unico io -  un indivi­
duo con nome e cognome ecc. 13. La trasformazione dell io non e indipenden­
te dai vincoli costituzionali inizialmente assunti e la scelta da nessun luogo 
rende le riforme virtualmente impossibili dal momento che le riforme hanno 
luogo necessariamente in un luogo e d’altra parte la prospettiva da nessun 
luogo non può costituire un’alternativa per qualcuno. Il vincolo fiscale ad 
esempio è un vincolo di prudenza 14 per gli individui futuri e qualora si 
rivelasse il contrario, gli individui futuri avrebbero la facoltà di rinegoziare il 
contratto costituzionale dal quale si ritenessero danneggiati. Ma perfino se si 
ammettesse che la rinegoziazione costituzionale possa costituire un onere 
eccessivo, la scelta da nessun luogo continuerebbe a rimanere un alternativa 
impraticabile: chi sa scegliere e per chi da nessun luogo?
L ’unico modo con cui sembra ragionevolmente acquisibile 1 imparzialità 
delle regole costituzionali non è quello di cacciare i costituenti e di porli nel 
limbo di nessun luogo ma quello di pensare regole costituzionali valide per 
un tempo indeterminato 15.
In conclusione, sia il velo rawlsiano, sia la decisione da nessun luogo 
visti dall’angolatura delle riforme costituzionali degli anni ’90 appaiono espe­
rimenti mentali e non impostazioni procedurali utilizzabili per riformare le 
costituzioni e le istituzioni esistenti. Per questo motivo, appare opportuno
12 Parfit 11986).
15 Per un’ampia discussione su questo punto vedi E usepi (1987).
14 Questo punto è stato sollevato con forza da Buchanan nel 1958 alla luce del fatto che 
quella che egli chiamava "thè old lime fiscal religion” che portava di per sé all’equilibrio di 
bilancio, era stata sostituita dalla filosofia della flessibilità rispetto alla quale il vincolo diventa 
«un  male pubblico». Cfr. ad esempio, G iovannini e Spaventa (1991) e Rowley (1987).
15 Cfr. Brennan e Buchanan (1985, specialmente cap. V).
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battere vie diverse. Anche se ciò comporta l’abbandono di edifìci che sembre­
rebbero perfetti ma che sono inabitabili per gli individui degli anni ’90.
4. Quando, agli inizi degli anni ’60, usci The Calculus o f Consent16 
l’obiettivo era quello di canalizzare l’attenzione alle decisioni non di merca- 
to, agli ordinamenti istituzionali che consentono la coesistenza di comporta­
menti politici potenzialmente conflittuali. Questo era abbastanza poiché il 
prevalente modello neoclassico era interessato all’equilibrio tramite lo scam­
bio dando per scontato che a livello individuale esso era acquisito automati­
camente: in questo senso le istituzioni venivano poste tra le ipotesi o tra i 
dati del problema. Posizione contraria alla Costituzione e alla regola era poi 
quella portata avanti dai neokeynesiani che vedevano in essa il vero ostacolo 
ad attuare fino in fondo la politica della piena occupazione. Fu proprio alla 
fine degli anni ’60 e agli inizi degli anni 7 0  che ebbe luogo un periodo di 
particolare interesse per l’approccio qui portato avanti. Si tratta della collabo- 
razione, breve, ma molto significativa, tra Buchanan e Bush 17 e che si 
rivolge al costituzionalismo, come alternativa all’anarchia partendo dall’indi­
viduo e in termini di costi di opportunità di questi.
Occorre tuttavia notare, che fino ad anni recenti 18, gli sviluppi del 
costituzionalismo non sono stati cosi promettenti come i contributi della 
scuola della Virginia avrebbero lasciato sperare e la materia è andata sempre 
più indirizzandosi verso la filosofia politica che tende a cercare più la compa­
tibilità del modello che il consenso degli individui reali. Da qui, il consenso 
su una Costituzione non poteva essere il risultato delle scelte degli individui 
o dei loro rappresentanti prò tempore, ma l’accettazione di un concetto di 
giustizia la cui approvazione era data in termini di coerenza del concetto in 
sé, come parametro assoluto o principio primo su cui individui astratti perfet­
tamente incerti non possono che concordare. In questa ottica l’apparato 
istituzionale-costituzionale evita e non supera i conflitti di interessi che non 
potranno che manifestarsi, perfino accresciuti, a livello post-costituzionale.
Se agli individui fosse dato di scegliere nel gioco costituzionale, il 
concetto di assoluto rimarrebbe al di là delle loro volontà in quanto l’assolu­
to esclude per definizione la scelta 19. Ed è per questo che l’impulso dato dal
16 Buchanan e Tullock (1962).
17 Buchanan e Bush (1974).
18 Cfr. B uchanan (1989).
Se fosse possibile inserire l’assoluto assoluto aH’interno del concetto di scelta, cosa che 
ovviamente non è, ipso facto, l’assoluto diverrebbe assoluto relativo. Questa distinzione non è 
puramente terminologica in quanto sposta l’attenzione da una conoscenza assoluta, che prescin­
de in tato dall agente che conosce, alla conoscenza relativa in quanto cioè risultato dell’azione
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libro di Rawls non va nella direzione auspicata qui. Individualismo significa 
partire dagli individui reali e non da individui ideali o idealizzati; l’idealismo 
ha commesso fin troppi misfatti negli ultimi due secoli, sia nella versione di 
destra sia nella versione di sinistra 20 per avere seria udienza nella prospetti­
va delle riforme costituzionali se non si vuole che tali riforme consistano in 
un panegirico dello stato. Il costituzionalismo non è la superiorità dello stato 
o della dottrina dello stato, è la superiorità della dottrina delle regole 21, la 
superiorità dei processi che diventano imperativi in senso kantiano, cioè 
etico, solo se gli individui non sono esclusi dalla eventuale rinegoziazione o 
revisione della Costituzione. È questo il punto decisivo e non il fatto che 
l’assenso alla Costituzione esistente sia stato effettivamente espresso dagli 
individui viventi; quest’ultima infatti, è un’argomentazione di per sé fuor­
viarne oltre che banale: se la Costituzione deve durare può essere posta a 
referendum potenziale, ma non deve essere posta a referendum sistematico. 
Non appare, infatti, rilevante l’argomento dell’approvazione postuma di una 
Costituzione promulgata quando gli individui esistenti non erano nati; que­
st’approvazione implicita è importante quando quella regola continua a rima­
nere inalterata, ma quando ci si pone in un’ottica dinamica, ciò che diventa 
rilevante per l’individuo che partecipa al gioco costituzionale è la rinegozia­
zione prospettica da parte della generazione vivente. Da questo punto di 
vista il problema è quello del costo come ostacolo alla decisione, è, cioè — 
per il fatto stesso di essere un ostacolo — un concetto ex ante e non ex post.
del conoscere che può essere si individuale o organizzata, ma inevitabilmente considera l’agente 
-  l’organizzazione di agenti -  che conosce come origine delle valutazioni. Mentre da quest’ulti­
mo punto di vista costituzionalismo significa quasi per necessità contrattualismo, essendo il 
contratto per definizione il metodo per il consenso tra decisori relativi, dal primo punto di vista 
costituzionalismo è di necessità emanazionismo che, sotto qualsiasi bandiera, si rifà allo stato 
come ente superiore e, quindi, primo ed unico decisore per i suoi sudditi. Le implicazioni 
politiche non possono essere trattate in questa sede, ma certamente non devono essere 
sottovalutate come emerge dalla vasta letteratura in tema di equilibrio burocratico. Vedi per 
esempio Baumöl (1959), Niskanen (1968), Leibernstein (1978) ed infine Brosio (a cura di) 
(1989) e ancora prima i contributi pionieristici del già ricordato Puviani (1972, 1973, 1975) in 
tema di illusione finanziaria.
20 La tendenza di molti intellettuali a schierarsi con la maggioranza spiega perché la critica 
degli anni ’90 sia stata essenzialmente diretta alla versione di sinistra o marxista dell’hegelismo. 
Occorre notare che non meno illiberale o antidemocratica è la versione di destra (Nietzsche) la 
cui posizione in apparenza soggettivista — ed è in questo senso che Buchanan lo ricorda spesso 
(1983) -  è in realtà nichilista e finisce per questa via per far rientrare sulla scena l’oggettivismo 
nella forma più pericolosa, anche politicamente, come cioè giustificazione di qualsiasi status quo 
esistente, inteso come risultato del piu forte e non come processo condiviso. Perciò i contributi 
che partono da quella direzione sono costituzionalmente « muti » e, quindi, non meritano di 
essere trattati qui.
21 Su questo punto cfr. Crisafulli (1970, specialmente cap. I).
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Dunque, l’individualismo come base del costituzionalismo appare la 
prospettiva corretta proprio perché la capacità di rinegoziazione rimane intat­
ta pure all’interno di una stabilità che ex ante è a tempo indeterminato. In 
questo contesto, la tesi istituzionalismo =  conservatorismo risulta priva di 
fondamento mentre appare vera la sua alternativa e cioè che l’idealismo è 
alla vera origine del conservatorismo etico sui generis-, quando l’individuo è 
escluso per definizione dalla scelta delle regole, come dalle scelte collettive o 
non di mercato, tali scelte non possono che essere fatte da un decisore 
generale che, sotto diverse vesti, è lo stato idolatrato: esattamente cioè la 
negazione dell’individuo.
Non sorprende perciò se alla base di partenza dell’approccio istituziona­
le non può esserci la giustizia astratta, ma la regola della concorrenza dinami­
ca che consente il risultato migliore per gli individui consumatori.
5. Gli obiettivi dell’economia costituzionale degli anni ’90 differiscono 
sostanzialmente da quelli esclusivamente teorici o di « fondazione logica » 
che hanno contraddistinto gli scorsi due decenni.
Il momento costituzionale degli inizi degli anni ’90 deriva da motivi 
realistici che hanno precostituito l’opportuno clima politico come base per il 
contributo intellettuale teorico; la fine dei regimi dell’Est, la crisi fiscale 
degli stati dell’occidente democratico costituiscono un privilegio particolare, 
che potrebbe anche essere irripetibile a favore dell’approccio costituzionali­
sta; più o meno apertamente e diffusamente si sta facendo avanti la convin­
zione per la quale gli inizi degli anni ’90 costituiscono la « necessaria frattu­
ra della storia » dal cui punto osservare il prima e, quello che più interessa 
in questa sede, disegnare il poi. È questa rottura della storia che consente di 
porre la prospettiva delle regole in un modo diverso e più concreto ad un 
mondo, specialmente quello che risulta dallo sfaldamento dell’Unione Sovie­
tica e della Jugoslavia, che rischia di portare con sé il dissolvimento dell’auto­
rità stessa. Naturalmente, questo renderebbe impossibile la coesistenza stes­
sa di gruppi civilmente organizzati. Ma questi problemi hanno un impatto 
anche sui paesi a tradizione democratica all’interno dei quali la prospettiva 
costituzionale non si è fatta ancora chiaramente strada almeno — ma certa­
mente non solo -  nel sistema politico italiano 22. Comunque, le crisi dell’Est
22 Tuttavia, non sono mancati lavori preparativi importanti, sia dal punto di vista delle 
riforme costituzionali, sia dal punto di vista delle istituzioni del controllo. Sul primo punto si 
vedano i lavori della Commissione Bozzi, sul secondo punto si veda Forte e Eusepi (1990). In 
un lavoro congiunto (Eusepi e Cerioni, 1993) ho cercato di individuare le ragioni della scarsa 
attenzione ai problemi costituzionali esaminando le vicende dell’art. 81 della Costituzione 
italiana che è stato uno dei piu criticati anche se le motivazioni di tali critiche sono piu da
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e dell’Ovest portano a ripensare ai principi costituzionali come a principi di 
stabilità relativamente assoluta e a prospettare quindi la stabilità che da tali 
principi deriva come situazione migliore rispetto all’anarchia o al caos costi­
tuzionali. Ed è esattamente in una situazione di questo genere che si trova 
gran parte del mondo occidentale 23.
In alcuni paesi, come l’Italia, la Costituzione scritta, o parti non trascu­
rabili di essa, è erosa 24 e, quindi, una riforma rapida rimane l’unico modo di 
prevenire il caos istituzionale. Diverso e più ampio discorso va fatto in 
prospettiva in riferimento ai rapporti tra Costituzioni nazionali di stati sovra­
ni e istituzioni europee nel senso che una Costituzione europea appare il 
prerequisito se quella a cui si vuol giungere non deve essere un’Europa 
come semplice fatto di mercato se non addirittura come semplice fatto 
geografico. Naturalmente, il realismo che deriva dall’approccio costituzionali­
sta degli anni ’90 porta di necessità a partire dallo status quo, dalle istituzio­
ni esistenti le quali devono trovare dei vantaggi se si vuole un loro gioco 
cooperativo. Questa logica motiva alla partecipazione tutti i giocatori preco­
stituendo il contesto di costo che dà luogo alla scelta che non precluda i 
vantaggi cui la scelta dà luogo a chi ha contribuito, in termini di tempo e di 
abilità, a condurre in porto l’intrapresa. In questo contesto il velo rawlsiano 
è reso per cosi dire meno spesso o più trasparente ma non è, né potrebbe 
essere integralmente rimosso; del resto questa differenziazione genuinamen­
te individualistica rispetto alla soggettività di specie che Rawls adotta da 
Kant non ha come obiettivo la rimozione del velo ma quello di rendere 
meno lontane le posizioni individuali che possono essere assunte a livello 
post-costituzionale. In un’ottica di riforma costituzionale un velo particolar­
mente spesso, come si è accennato, azzera i vantaggi individuali prospettici e 
agisce in definitiva nel senso di assolutizzare le istituzioni presenti. Se gli 
individui non possono, almeno in parte, ragionevolmente calcolare i vantag­
gi prospettici, l’impegno alla partecipazione al gioco costituzionale potrebbe 
configurarsi ex ante un costo tale da rendere insopportabile la partecipazione 
o prezzo di ingresso al gioco costituzionale. Perché infatti sopportare costi
individuarsi nel ruolo genuinamente costituzionale che è quello di vincolo al legislatore 
ordinario che nella identificazione di errori che ne suggerirebbero l’abolizione.
23 Punto questo che include sia gli Stati Uniti che l’Europa seppure in modi diversi, come 
opportunamente sottolineato in due importanti studi recenti. Cfr. Bernholz (1990) e Bucha­
nan (1991).
24 Si pensi all’art. 81 in tema di equilibrio di bilancio, all’art. 23 in tema di imposta e al 
tentativo di modificare l’art. 138 che rimane forse l’unico argine in un paese in cui il mercato 
politico tende ad escludere il normale ruolo maggioranza opposizione e a sostituirlo con una 
collusione generalizzata.
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differenziali quando i rendimenti attesi sarebbero ugualmente acquisiti a 
costo zero? La prospettiva delle riforme costituzionali non consiste nell’im­
possibilità di prevedere i vantaggi per sé, ma nell’impossibilità che alcuni o 
molti giocatori anziché scegliere le regole, determinino il risultato 25.
Dunque è sufficiente che i giocatori non possano scegliere i risultati 
perché il contesto costituzionale sia operativo nel senso che ipso facto la 
scelta non può consistere che tra strategie alternative disponibili, mentre i 
risultati non possono essere previsti ex ante neppure da un individuo perfet­
tamente razionale dal momento che le sue scelte, per attuarsi, devono essere 
compatibili con le scelte, a lui ignote, di individui altrettanto razionali ma 
diversi. Dunque il vincolo costituzionale attiene alla fissazione di stabili 
regole del gioco, mentre i risultati sono necessariamente variabili, dal mo­
mento che solo se le partite sono truccate il risultato può essere determinato 
ex ante. Ma a queste condizioni il gioco perde tutto il suo interesse, tale 
interesse rimane se e nella misura in cui gli spettatori sono ignari che il 
risultato è stato prefissato. Ma quale senso costituzionale o vincolo costitu­
zionale verrebbe a costituire una qualsiasi regola? Quando si determinano i 
risultati ex ante non è più possibile distinguere i contributi dei diversi 
giocatori perché i giocatori stessi non avrebbero alcuna possibilità di incide­
re, seppure indirettamente, sui risultati dal momento che agli individui non 
è lasciato alcun ruolo. Ci troviamo quindi di fronte ad una costituzione senza 
costituenti, di fronte cioè ad una democrazia senza demos-, è una costituzione 
che sancisce il predominio del più forte. Se i risultati delle riforme derivano 
da interazione di scelte, tali risultati cambiano se cambiano le regole. La tesi 
di Hayek per la quale noi non scegliamo coscientemente le regole in base 
alle quali giochiamo e che lo sviluppo o evoluzione culturale non costituisce 
una scelta razionale, non nega che ci possa essere una scelta esplicita — ad 
esempio l’accordo circa una costituzione CEE modificativa del trattato di 
Roma il cui obiettivo è quello di rendere un trattato tra nazioni un atto 
interno tra membri di una collettività più ampia — e che tale scelta in 
prospettiva inciderà sulle regole dell’evoluzione politica e sociale. Ma questo 
contesto di regole artificiali, renderebbe lo sviluppo culturale diverso da 
quello biologico cui Hayek sembra riferirsi26.
6. La « mentalità costituzionale », anche quella delle riforme costituzio­
nali e non semplicemente quella che si riferisce al modello generale anar­
”  Su questo punto cfr. Buchanan (1989) e Forte (1991).
2t Per un’analisi pregevole del concetto di norma costituzionale rispetto alla legge naturale 
specialmente dal punto di vista della diversa capacità previsionale, cfr. Crisafulli (1970, 
specialmente capitolo 1) e Brennan e Buchanan (1985).
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chia-ordine è incompatibile o comunque contrasta radicalmente con la menta­
lità pianificatrice: la pianificazione attiene ai risultati mentre le riforme 
costituzionali attengono alle regole. Di conseguenza, il controllo del Leviata­
no statale è compito che spetta alla Costituzione e non può essere posticipa­
to in quanto fenomeno di organizzazione pratica 27. Tuttavia, le riforme 
costituzionali dei paesi interni alla CEE, ad esempio, difficilmente potrebbe­
ro prescindere dalla prospettiva dell’unione politica e dalla necessità di un 
governo centrale, che sebbene limitato da una Costituzione europea, appare 
l’unica prospettiva per il mantenimento della libertà degli scambi piena e 
generale, intesa cioè sia come movimento di prodotti, di fattori della produ­
zione, sia come rimozione delle barriere visibili e invisibili, tecniche e politi­
che, che appaiono difficilmente conciliabili col concetto di sovranità illimita­
ta dello stato nazionale. Ciò emerge analizzando l’art. 11 della Costituzione 
italiana che consente l’introduzione delle fonti comunitarie nell’ordinamento 
interno; tuttavia, « il prezzo d’ingresso » è anche subordinato ad obiettivi 
internazionali quali il mantenimento della pace a cui l’ingresso di tali fonti 
sembra essere confinato 28. Vi sarebbero cioè valori costituzionali irrinuncia­
bili che, in quanto tali, precluderebbero l’operatività di fonti internazionali, 
incluse quelle comunitarie nelle quali non necessariamente tali valori, costitu­
zionalmente protetti, trapassano. Rimane, dunque, da risolvere il problema 
di eventuali attribuzioni di competenze tra singoli stati e comunità europea 
prospettando una qualche analogia (in riferimento al caso italiano, art. 
117-120 Cost.) tra governo centrale e governo regionale in termini di legisla­
zione di principio, che in questo contesto spetterebbe alla CEE, e legislazio­
ne di dettaglio che sarebbe di competenza dei singoli governi. Questa pro­
spettiva, ovviamente, sembra andare oltre la logica dell’art. 11, in quanto 
prefigura una sovranità limitata che di per sé non è compatibile con l’assenza 
di una Costituzione europea della quale costituisce il presupposto logico.
7. Come ha mostrato Francesco Forte, in presenza di sovranità illimita­
ta, tenderebbero ad emergere molto più facilmente forme oligopolistiche 29 
che sono di per se stesse incompatibili con la libertà degli scambi e questa 
tesi sarebbe perfettamente in linea con il concetto smithiano dell’ampiezza 
del mercato come limite alla domanda e alla divisione del lavoro 30. Le
27 Cfr. Buchanan (1991, specialmente par. 3). Ho cercato di sottolineare la tendenza 
eurocratica della Commissione CEE in materia di armonizzazione fiscale in una mia recensione 
a Forte (1990). Vedi il mio scritto (Eusepi, 1992).
28 Vedi art. 11 della Costituzione italiana.
29 Cfr. Forte (1989).
,0 Si noti per inciso che l’art. 120 della Costituzione italiana prevede divieti alle regioni
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riforme degli anni ’90 devono quindi abbandonare l’idea di sovranità illimita­
ta e questo anche perché la limitazione della sovranità nazionale da parte 
della Costituzione europea appare in prospettiva l’unico modo per impedire i 
nazionalismi senza, allo stesso tempo, creare un modello accentratore in 
grado di autoespandersi grazie alla sovranità illimitata del piu forte. L ’esem­
pio classico è costituito dalla teoria brezhneviana in base alla quale sono 
state consumate tragedie come l’occupazione della Cecoslovacchia nel ’69 e 
dieci anni dopo la guerra dell’Afghanistan. Non sono affatto sicuro che la 
politica per la riforma delle istituzioni europee come delle istituzioni italiane 
si ispiri ai principi ed ai valori prospettati in questo lavoro. Le specificità, se 
non collidenti, devono essere costituzionalmente mantenute e non tutto può 
essere raccolto sotto la rubrica delle armonizzazioni: una scuola europea 
accentrata diventa di necessità un apparato militare napoleonico, perde i 
connotati dell’esperienza educativa, e in quanto tale individuale, per diventa­
re un « caleidoscopio » di materiale di riporto, disorganico, caotico e gerar­
chico 31.
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METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM, CONSTITUTIONAL MARKET, 
AND THE “SHORT ROUTE” TO A CONSTITUTION WITHOUT CON­
STITUENTS
The paper is a first attempt to extend the subjectivist opportunity cost 
theory to the constitutional game. This is done using methodological individualism 
procedure as a tool of analysis.
The author argues that the logic of constitutional reforms -  rather than the 
simple passage anarchy-order -  is the typical context where methodological 
individualism represents a particularly promising starting point. From such a 
perspective the constitutional game cannot be considered either a neutral game, 
or a zero-sum game any longer. This induces the author to critically reconsider 
the constitutional game as a “quasi-permanent” public good where the “quasi” 
becomes the central core, in that it excludes both the “absolutely absolute 
absolutes”, which prevent the game from being played, and the absolutely relative 
relatives, which instead prevent constitutional stability.
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THE ITALIAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TERTIARY SECTOR: 
WELL-KNOWN PROBLEMS AND TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS
by
A n n a  P e l l a n d a  *
1. Nature of the Tertiary Sector. Time Element
From the point of view of economic analysis the tertiary sector is 
synonymous with services, offered both by the State and by private organiza­
tions. To define services is a problematic matter. The first classification was 
attempted in the 1970s; it divided services into finished products, ready for 
consumption, and intermediate products to be used in industry. During the 
mid 1980s another classification pointed out that services in relation to 
added value produced, employment created and geographic location were, 
according to CEE and NATO statistics, of a much more complicated na­
ture '.
From the point of view of the History of Economics, all services were 
considered unproductive by Smith * 12 while commerce was defined a “ sack” 
by Marx 3; public services, instead, were linked to the birth of the “welfare 
state” in the 1920s 4 and to the beginning of the State’s intervention in the 
economy by von Mises 5.
It is certainly not easy to define the nature of services. A reason for
*  University of Padova, Department of Economics, Padova (Italy).
This article is the amended version of the paper presented at the 2nd World Congress of 
the International Society for Intercommunication of New Ideas (ISINI) held at the University 
of Athens, June-July 1992. The author is particularly grateful for comments and writings to 
Professors Maurice Lagueux, Aldo Montesano and Anghel N. Rugina.
1 Iscom (1988, pp. 317-22).
2 Smith (1776, book 2, ch. 3).
3 Marx (1867, book 3, section 4, ch. 20).
3 G lennester (1990, ch. 2).
’ v. Mises (1944).
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this can be found in the difficulty to disentangle labour from capital and 
land. Labour exerted in services, exactly as that used in industry and agricul­
ture, is complemented by the other two factors of production. A production 
function with only one independent variable is an abstract device to study 
average and marginal productivity but, in order to depict reality, the inde­
pendent variables must be at least two. Nothing can be produced, for in­
stance, by labour alone. Thus services, which are the typical product of 
labour, in order to reach the market need at least the help of capital.
Also their being usually neither material nor durable represents a diffi­
culty, although we know what Smith forgot to consider: that a book, a 
document a.s.o. show that the product of labour can be materialized, can 
last and help further production, for instance, of human capital6.
An element which can characterize services and distinguish them from 
all other products is the circumstance that the moment of production of 
services coincides with the moment of their demand. Services come to 
existence only if requested: a professional person can live, may be, very 
poorly, without clients, but his work cannot take place without an effective 
demand for it. Also banks, hotels, means of transportation can exist as fixed 
capital but, without customers, the services they can supply do not come 
into reality. A theatre performance with no audience is cancelled. A painting 
can be produced and demanded without being sold only because of the 
“inner need” of the painter to realize it. This brings us to the figure of the 
“prosumer” (the individual both producer and consumer) considered below 
while dealing with self-services. Here we can emphasize the concept of time 
as a mean to distinguish services from goods: time in relation to services 
synchronizes their supply and demand, while in relation to goods time 
requires to pass from the moment of production to the moment of market 
demand. Thus services can be, rather than durable, repeating themselves 
and the rate of interest, as the instrument for measuring time, is, in this 
context, a capitalized rather than a discount rate.
2. Measurement and Remuneration of Services. Fiscal Difficulties
Although human labour is the most pervasive factor of the whole 
productive structure, it represents the typical foundation of the tertiary 
sector. But, as opposed to land in agriculture and capital in industry, labour 
is much less homogeneous and its marginal productivity much less measura­
6 Montesano (1989, pp. 13-17).
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ble. Labour exerted in the field of transport, for instance, is of a different 
kind than labour carried on in teaching. Human capacities required by the 
so-called liberal professions are quite divergent from the qualities necessary 
to enter the public administration. A very long list of qualifications, both 
natural and acquired, characterizes various types of labour devoted to serv­
ices. For these reasons it is difficult to give an objective definition of labour.
But the very great problem of labour exerted in the tertiary sector 
relates to its marginal productivity. Although productivity of services is 
commonly attributed to the natural endowments, capital equipment, scholas­
tic education or technical training of people, it is very hard to know which 
increment of the total product has to be attributed to an increment of labour 
developed in services. Certainly the same concept of marginal productivity is 
subject to criticism 7 as it is difficult to isolate one factor of production from 
the others complementing it, and measure its contribution to the creation of 
the final product. Still the application of the mathematical instrument of the 
partial derivative to capital and land has furnished at least orientative results 
because capital and land can be reduced to some homogeneity and thus be 
approximately measured. This is not possible with labour due to its being 
made up of too different and immaterial elements which render it unquanti- 
fiable.
The above difficulty from the productive sphere is carried over to the 
distributive side of the question making it more or less impossible to 
calculate salaries of employees working in services in a fair way. This 
creates disputes over wages and salaries earned in agriculture and industry. 
In these sectors, in fact, remunerations, if not measurable to a precise 
degree, can certainly be ascertained more accurately than those in services. 
This means, at least in the Italian case, that at every action led by trade 
unions to obtain increased salaries and wages, people working in agriculture 
and industry feel less protected against inflation and unemployment. Firstly, 
they have the impression of being victims of discrimination, their salaries 
being lower in comparison with those paid for services, given the difficulty 
to quantify the productivity of the tertiary sector. Secondly, the Italian law 
does not allow 8 dismissal of people working in the public administration 
and this circumstance discriminates between State employees and those 
working in private services. Given that public employees produce services 
primarily, social conflicts arise in relation to unemployment, also among 
agricultural and industrial workers on the one hand and public employees
7 Pellanda (1989, pp. 22-27).
8 D.P.R. January 10, 1957, n. 3. Art. 63, 71, 77, 84, 85, 127.
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on the other. Although a law trying to change this situation is presently the 
object of parliamentary discussion (see Section 5), the present reality is still 
highly conflicting.
From the above, another difficulty arises and it belongs to the field of 
taxation: if services are public, their remuneration is directly taxed by the 
State; but when they are private, it is not easy to know the entity of 
earnings upon which taxes can be levied. In Italy the phenomenon of fiscal 
evasion, especially in the areas of commerce and the professions, is so 
widespread and serious to represent a negative item of public deficit. We 
think that, moral behaviour of Italians apart, at the root of this evil there is 
the lack of an objective measure for salaries in private services. A lawyer, 
for instance, can avoid the due taxation on his income because nobody 
knows how much he charges his clients. The same happens with shopkeep­
ers, although in Italy, they have recently been compelled by law to give 
customers a receipt for all commercial transactions. But as “every law has a 
loophole” in order to grant and obtain a reduced price on the market, fewer 
and fewer receipts are produced and demanded! Of course the Ministry of 
Finance tries to levy taxes on private services by means of other devices, but 
the fact remains that employees of public administrations are directly taxed 
by the State, while those working in the private sphere can hide their true 
earnings and thus avoid taxation.
3. Different Problems and Solutions for Services
Since the 1980s public and private services have absorbed in Italy and 
in other European countries a higher percentage of employees in comparison 
with agriculture and industry. The phenomenon has been called “de-indus- 
trialization”, meaning that an ever smaller number of people are employed 
in industry and an ever greater number in services. Today we know that we 
can talk of “tertiarization” of industry understanding that employment is 
increasing in services without decreasing in industry.
It is possible to generally look upon the tertiary sector as being the 
greatest source of employment in developed countries. However, public and 
private services differ as regards their peculiar problems and possible so­
lutions.
At least in Italy public services deal with public goods and operate 
monopolistically. The private ones are instead guided by entrepreneurial 
criteria, concerned with problems of profit and costs and they are negatively 
characterized by fiscal evasion, as mentioned before.
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Some possible solutions for the improvement of public services are (1) 
denationalization of many of them; (2) a change of legislation allowing the 
introduction of competition, both national and international; (3) a better 
technical training for employees of the sector. Solutions which could im­
prove private services concern (4) greater attention towards consumers’ de­
mand, (5) more correct fiscal behaviour, (6) more marketing for the im­
provement both of the economic theory and the practical reality of services.
4. Public Services: Problems
The existence of public goods implies the existence of a public adminis­
tration. This thesis is, however, considered too academic and some authors 
substitute it with the other one which maintains that public administration 
exists because it is “linked to the welfare of politicians who occupy impor­
tant positions” 9. Looking more deeply into the problem, the nature of 
public goods must be considered.
Public goods are characterized by the fact of being useful in an uncon­
scious way to consumers (thus they cannot have a market price); moreover, 
they are not-divisible pro capite and cannot be rejected (like their opposite, 
the public evils). From this it follows that the market mechanism cannot fit 
the production and distribution of public goods. Usually they are services 
and are committed to the State which adopts political criteria for their supply 
and charges political prices (tariffs) for their sale. The justification for the 
State production of public services and for their sale at political prices, 
pretends to respond to criteria of social equity, that is to say, to allow also 
people with low incomes to receive education, medical care, justice, social 
security, defence (to quote only the very important public goods) at an 
accessible tariff.
Maybe this was in the mind of Pigou and other theorists of the “wel­
fare state” but in reality things are quite different. Public services are 
produced and sold as a State monopoly where consumers’ surpluses are 
transferred to an expansion of production and to a waste of resources to the 
only benefit of bureaucrats. In fact as Niskanen (1971) and Williamson
9 Moe (1984, p. 63 of the Italian ed. by Brosio).
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(1964) pointed out 10 it is not profit which matters for public managers, but 
the size of the public firm from which they derive political power, higher 
salaries and possibility of distributing social favours. The economist would 
comment that the slope of the demand curve and the level of costs do not 
matter for monopolistic producers of public goods and more generally that 
both efficacy and efficiency are, in these circumstances, missing. Given that 
these two economic prerequisites are missing also in the private tertiary, 
discussion of the subject is deferred there. For the time being it can be 
concluded that public services follow political and not economical criteria. 
In a sense, they conform to the model of the new institutional theory of the 
firm.
If the neoclassical theory is considered obsolete because it does not 
take into adequate consideration the institutional elements which intervene 
in the practical working of the firm, no better field than the State’s produc­
tion of public goods demonstrates this conception. According to Coase 
(1937) and to Simon (1947) the firm exists because it deals with transaction 
(not only production) costs and it uses a hierarchical organization. Transac-
10 According to Niskanen the behav­
iour of bureaucrats directing public firms 
in a monopolistic regime can be visualiz­
ed by the graph on the right where L is 
the demand curve, MC the marginal cost, 
Qa the quantity produced efficiently, QB 
the quantity produced embodying consum­
ers’ surplus ABC. Production is expanded 
till ABC =  CDE. A more complete graph 
could be the one below:
where Q„ is the efficient quanti­
ty because it corresponds to 
point P where minimum mar­
ginal cost meets marginal rev­
enue (MR), Qb is instead pro­
duced where ABC =  CDE by 
construction and marginal cost 
(MC), taken as a constant, is 
higher as employment is larger. 
See Orzechowski (1977, pp. 
349 and 374 of the Italian ed. 
by Brosio).
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tion costs are due to the fact that all market operations are considered legal 
contracts, and hierarchical organizations are necessary because of lack of 
information and perfect knowledge. Thus employees are each put in their 
place in order to reach satisfactory, although not optimum results. This is 
according to theoretical explanations, but its practical translation into reality 
shows that things go quite differently. In the case of public firms and at 
least in Italy, one can observe that managers do indeed make contracts with 
a view to political and social transactions at local, regional, national level 11 
rather than to economic objectives. Certainly they do not take profit and 
costs into consideration as very often they produce at a loss.
One of the reasons for this bad economic management is the accep­
tance of the ^presence of “free riders” 12 among the employees: instead of 
trying to find a way to measure and increase their productivity, free riders 
are considered an unavoidable evil. Another cause of economic loss is the 
lack of dynamism in decision making procedures. Given that each operation 
must obtain the approval of a hierarchical organization, the mass of docu­
ments required is so huge as to hinder the successful economic working of 
each initiative. Looking at this example of “institutional” firm one might be 
inclined to think it represents a good theoretical justification for economic 
failures.
5. Public Services: Solutions
The public tertiary in all European countries produces too many serv­
ices. If it is necessary to have a national defence since otherwise anyone, 
sufficiently rich, could have his own private army; if it is indispensable to 
have a common justice, otherwise there would be as many courts as there 
are contenders; if it is fair, that also the weakest part of the population gets 
education, medical care and social security at an accessible price; if it is 
socially right that people with lower incomes or pensions can travel, have 
housing, telephone, postal services and other services at reduced rates, rents, 
subscriptions, stamps and so on, still there is no reason for leaving in the 
hands of State bureaucrats the management of all these activities, apart from 
defence, justice, taxation.
In reality and again in Italy, the State, alias the parliament and gov-
11 Dente (1990, p. 20 etc.); the author considers these transactions as ambiguous and 
conflictual.
12 Moe (1984, pp. 45-7 of the Italian ed. by Brosio).
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eminent, look only for political consent and do not care for the people’s 
well-being. The bureaucrats they employ to realize their policies often lack 
the necessary economic knowledge as would enable them to operate with 
competence. They are in fact not “naturally selected” by the market 13 like 
the entrepreneurs of private firms but politically appointed or chosen 
through public competitions rules by juridical 14 *not economic requirements. 
And they allow themselves to disregard economic calculations, the budgets 
on which they work being planned for authorizing expenses not for control­
ling them On top of all this, the Italian legislation permits them to 
operate as monopolists, as said before, and grants them and their subordi­
nates employment security and impossibility of dismissal.
It must be reported that in Italy since December 1992 things have 
started to change. A law is now under discussion in Parliament: this law 
belongs to a wider design of institutional reforms concerning the fields of 
national health and local finance. It is in line with the process of denational­
ization initiated by the present government and it concerns various aspects 
of the public administration. First of all, public managers with the exception 
of top judges and university, police, diplomacy employees will be considered 
“economically” responsible for their decisions and no longer covered by 
political warrant. They will be entitled to change their working time with a 
previous agreement with trade unions. As to labour mobility and salaries of 
all public employees they will vary according to local necessities and person­
al duties.
These measures, to be adopted as soon as the Parliament will give its 
approval 16, represent, for the Italian public tertiary sector, a sort of revolu­
tion. For this reason it is easy to understand the negative reactions they 
caused among public employees and trade unionists. Once again the general 
trade unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL), defending the interests of all workers, do 
agree with the government project, while specific organizations (UNICO- 
BAS), representing only the public sector, complain against the government 
and the other (general) trade unions.
A confirmation that a revolution of the public sector is underway 
comes from another measure due to be taken when all articles of the law 
will pass. Still in May 1992, when this paper was written, we wrote that to 
think of eliminating all the distorsions of the sector without denationalizing 
public services, changing the law and providing economic training for public
13 Idem, p. 64 of the Italian ed. by Brosio.
14 Dente (1991, p. 355); Petretto (1990, pp. 38-9).
D ente (1990, p. 23).
16 This law was partially passed on January 23, 1993.
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employees, seems utopia. A market, free to compete nationally and interna­
tionally, and a higher level of education for people working in the public 
tertiary sector (and particularly in Public Finance) 17, like that provided by 
French and English or Japanese 18 schools, are considered indispensable to 
keep public services working in Italy. In these days the government has 
promised to provide schools of public administration, at university level, for 
high rank staff, while we are waiting for the first denationalization of public 
institutions and firms. State is moving toward market not only in Eastern 
Europe!
6. Private Services: Problems
To have a private tertiary sector does not necessarily mean to be 
provided with efficient and efficacious services 19 because also in this sector 
many problems are still to be solved. Certainly private services, being pro­
duced according to market rules, benefit from market information through 
prices, and, being subject to competition, try to work productively. Still 
private services hardly satisfy consumers’ demands (efficacy) and seldom 
work productively (efficiency).
First of all it is interesting to introduce the new term “ servuction” 
invented by Pierre Eiglier and Eric Langeard (1987) to mean production of 
services. In this process, differently from what happens in the production of 
goods, the role of customers, who are at the same time consumers and 
producers of services, is very important. This is so evident in the case of 
self-services that it is possible to speak of “prosumer” 20. Another very 
relevant aspect of servuction is the behaviour of people directly offering the 
services to customers or staff-in-direct-contact with consumers. This rapport 
is so meaningful that Normann 21 says that servuction is characterized by 
“personality intensity” as compared with “capital intensity” in industrial 
production. But in the generality of situations, customers take part in servuc­
tion through their comments and claims; actually, the more “active” they are 
in noticing bad or good aspects of services, the more “prosumers” they 
become.
Instead, the element that is shared by services and industry is the
17 D ente (1991, p. 355); Visco (1990, pp. 199-219).
18 Pellanda (1992, p. 3).




incidence of physical support or capital which appears more and more 
determinant as more services become automatized (for example bank out­
door counter services). This is another way to point out the complementari­
ty between labour and capital. Still it is labour the typical and scarce 
resource in services and the problem of how to measure its productivity 
arises again. In the private sector, as opposed to the public one, a help to 
know, if not to measure, labour productivity comes from consumers who 
can appreciate or criticize services and thus offer a kind of reference. For 
instance, when they appreciate the services of a hotel they go back to it and 
show the so-called “fidelity of consumers”; if they have something to com­
plain about they change hotel and, in so doing, they encourage competition 
among hotels. But a precise quantification of labour exerted in services is 
impossible given two main difficulties: first of all, customers’ judgements 
are very subjective, relative and changeable 22; secondly, it is very hard for 
consumers to judge the value of labour developed in some liberal profes­
sions such as by lawyers, physicians and so on. The new “theory of the 
agency” 23 focuses this problem trying to solve it with the contract a “princi­
pal” (consumer) stipulates with an “agent” (producer of services) delegating 
decisions and competence to him. This theory ought to help also on the 
distribution side of the matter, as a principal pays a good agent more than a 
bad one. But all this has never been demonstrated nor confirmed by a large 
enough number of reported cases.
What is instead very frequent in the reality of the private tertiary, is 
the circumstance that if labour becomes too expensive, machine will substi­
tute it in all possible situations, especially when services can be largely 
automatized. This substitution not only reflects the decision of entrepreneurs 
to follow the logic of an isoquantic production function, but also the legal 
context in which it can happen. At least in Italy it is possible to dismiss 
people on “justifiable grounds” 24 and economic difficulties of private firms 
are a reasonable motive for dismissing people at all levels, from managers 
to workers, individually or collectively.
Given the impossibility of measuring labour, as pointed out in Sections 
2 and 5, the danger of fiscal evasion derives as a practical consequence. In 
the private sector it is very hard for the Ministry of Finance to check 
whether people pay the right taxes, as their incomes are neither known nor 
quantifiable with certainty. On the other hand, this enables people working
22 Cercola (1990, p. 22 etc.; p. 184 etc.).
23 Harris, Raviv (1976); Tiroce (1986).
24 Italian Civil Code, art. 2119.
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in the private services to avoid paying the right taxes on their income due to 
the well known difficulty in levying a fair taxation on an unknown, con­
cealed income.
Another problem to be considered in relation to private services is a 
kind of entrepreneurial mentality which, at least in Italy, has recently been 
dominating the sector. For instance, to be rather badly treated in a legal or a 
medical office or in a bank is a frequent experience. The impression on the 
part of customers is that the behaviour both of single professionists and 
large institutions is oriented to save time and to gain as much as possible. 
This is in line with the traditional theory of the firm which studies the 
comparison between revenues (gain) and costs (time) and we can conclude 
that from both an analytical and practical point of view the relevance of 
demand has been neglected. This happens in private as well as in public 
services, although for different reasons.
As mentioned above, public services — at least in Italy as long as things 
do not change -  operate in a monopolistic regime and with no budget 
control; this leads to paying much less attention to the slope of the demand 
curve than what a private monopolist would do, and to have no fear of 
failure because the Italian political system, up to now, does not require its 
bureaucrats to produce economic results and allows them to waste public 
money. But the elasticity of demand for services is equally disregarded in 
the private tertiary sector. It is the lack of attention to marketing which 
seems responsible for this situation and which, both in theory and in prac­
tice, represents a problem for services. The theory of the firm gives indeed 
too little space to marketing and to demand analysis, while Italian consum­
ers are more and more dissatisfied with the services they get. Thus many 
Italians are looking forward to the European integration of 1993 which will 
allow foreigners to operate in Italy and (hopefully) provide better services.
7. Private Services: Solutions
We will now consider some tentative solutions to the problems charac­
terizing private services. If consumers are so important to represent, with 
their judgements and their payments, a kind of reference for measuring 
labour exerted in services, it is urgent to take them into more consideration. 
Their needs and expectations, if adequately satisfied by services, render the 
latter more efficacious. Given that services have a technical support in 
physical structures, a continuous search for functional improvement must be 
looked for. Still it is labour at all levels that is the most important factor of
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“servuction” and it needs constant up-to-day training. Human labour, cou­
pled with capital, make services efficient.
Both efficacy and efficiency belong to the item called “quality of ser­
vices”. In the 1970s the quality of services was not taken too much into 
consideration. Only in the 1980s control of the quality (in the sense of 
correspondence to given parameters), then for the quality (meaning conti­
nuous improvement), later on of the total quality (as conformity to necessi­
ties) 25 was undertaken. But it was under the influence of Japan, of its 
economic success and its social philosophy, that the Western countries 
started to study the so-called global quality which means to offer services 
trying to satisfy not only the material wants of people, but also their 
spiritual needs. In more technical terms, attention must be transferred from 
products supplied to processes through which they are supplied. This new 
way of “servuction” pays more attention to quality than to quantity and 
involves everybody from top managers to bottom employees.
This new approach, to which services, both private and public, ought 
to conform, compels firms to change: it requires more training to under­
stand consumers’ expectations and less concentration on costs, profit and 
sales 26. It represents a new way of organizing services in daily life and 
implies the introduction of a larger number of components in Economics. 
The tertiary sector in Italy is, in many respects, dominated by a too 
conservative management and by a scarcely informed and involved staff27. 
In its turn, economic science pays more attention to the analytical tools of 
Political Economy than to elements of Business Administration. Services 
need training, Economics lacks marketing. Both must change to avoid 
failures and obsolescence.
What is required is a change of mentality on the part of managers and 
theorists. And not only for the production and the theory of services, but 
also for the solution of another typical difficulty of the sector: the fiscal 
problem. Unless people are convinced that to pay taxes is a social duty, they 
will try to avoid doing so. Unless they realize that private abuses are public 
damages, they will go on concealing income from their unmeasurable la­
bour. But as long as men think in terms of their own material advantage, it 
is unlikely that they will mature a “global” approach to quality, not only of 
services, but of life itself.
21 Cercola (1990, p. 19 etc.).
26 Zeithaml, Parasuraman. Berry (1990, eh. V).
27 Idem, eh. VIII.
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IL SETTORE TERZIARIO PUBBLICO E PRIVATO IN ITALIA: PROBLEMI 
NOTI E POSSIBILI SOLUZIONI
Settore terziario significa servizi. I servizi sono difficili da classificare (per­
ché eterogenei e immateriali) e da quantificare (perché, basati sul lavoro umano, 
vengono altamente complementad dal capitale tecnico).
I servizi in Italia sono pubblici e privati. I primi, nati per motivi d’equità, 
risultano tragicamente inefficienti causa procedure burocratiche e prerogative le­
gislative. La loro privatizzazione insieme a cambiamenti legislativi favorevoli alla 
concorrenza e a scuole per amministratori pubblici sono i rimedi da adottare. 
Una legge del 23 gennaio 1993 è in linea con questo lavoro scritto nella prima­
vera del 1992.
I servizi privati sono visti alla luce delle teorie della « servuzione », « agen­
zia » e « consumatore/produttore ». Tuttavia l’insufficiente attenzione, sia teorica 
che pratica, dedicata in Italia alla domanda dei consumatori, all’innovazione del 
capitale tecnico, alla mentalità imprenditoriale, indica che anche nel terziario pri­
vato molti sono i problemi ancora da risolvere.
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 40 (1993), N. 8, 671-682
GROUP EFFECTS IN REGRESSION MODELS
by
Steven B. Caudill *
Introduction
Most data in economics fall naturally into groups. For example a 
sample of individuals can be grouped by state, SMSA, or country of resi­
dence. The pooling of time-series and cross-section data creates two possible 
groupings; observations can be grouped by time period, or they can be 
grouped across time periods by state, SMSA, or country of residence. Data 
that vary only at the group level are frequendy included as regressors in 
regression models.
To see how popular this practice has become, one need only examine 
recent volumes of any economic journal containing empirical research. In a 
study on marriage and divorce appearing in the American Economic Review, 
Peters (1986) uses a national sample of individuals, and includes variables 
on the state divorce rate and the state percent Catholic as regressors. In a 
study on Canadian migration published in the Journal of Political Economy, 
Shaw (1986) estimates regression models in which the unit of observation is 
the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA). Some of the models Shaw estimates 
include province-level variables such as the ratio of the number of weeks of 
paid unemployment insurance in a province to the number of weeks of 
unemployed labor in the province. Each CMA in a province is assigned the 
same value of this ratio. In a study on the incidence of co-authorship 
appearing in the Review of Economics and Statistics, Barnett, Ault and 
Kaserman (1988) estimate a model with a pooled time-series and cross- 
section data set. The dependent variable is the number of authors of papers
4 Auburn University, Department of Economics, Auburn University, AL (U.S.A.).
The author is grateful to John D. Jackson for his helpful comments, and to Andy Barnett, 
Richard Ault, and David Kaserman for providing their data.
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published in the AER from 1960 through 1985. One of the regressors in 
their model is the number of submissions to the AER in each year, and this 
does not vary across observations in a particular year. In the Southern 
Economic Journal, Shaw (1987) estimates models using data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, and includes a measure of the 
area unemployment. In an article appearing in the same volume, Roback 
(1987) estimates models using the 1973 four percent Census of Colombia, 
and includes the area unemployment rate as a regressor. Clearly the practice 
is quite common.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the properties of econometric 
models which include group variables as regressors, and to compare these 
models to econometric models that instead use group dummy variables as 
regressors. Any researcher who uses group variables can also use group 
dummies.
If the group information is included in the regression model only to 
satisfy ceteris paribus conditions, then group dummy variables should be 
included instead of group variables. The dummy variables explain at least as 
much variation as the group regressors. Additionally, if dummy variables are 
used, the possibility of omitting relevant group variables is eliminated.
The situation is somewhat different if the group variables are included 
to estimate parameters of interest. Then, the 'dummy variable model is not 
an option. The danger of omitting relevant explanatory group variables 
remains a problem, but a statistical test can be used to determine the 
severity of the problem.
The next section of this paper demonstrates that if the dummy variable 
model is estimated when the group variable model is correct, the explanato­
ry power of the dummy variable model is equal to the explanatory power of 
the model using group variables as regressors. The estimates of coefficients 
of non-grouped variables are the same with either model; and if each group 
variable is multiplied by its coefficient and the result is summed across 
groups, the sum equals the dummy variable coefficient. The second section 
also shows that if the group variable version is estimated when the dummy 
variable version is correct, there may be omitted variable problems. The 
third section provides a discussion of the implications of the second section 
for empirical research, and it provides a statistical test to help determine 
when the use of group variables as regressors is ill-advised. The fourth 
section illustrates the implications of these results by applying what has 
been learned to the study on co-authorship by Barnett, Ault and Kaserman.
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Demonstration
Three results are proven in this section. First, if the dummy variable 
version of a model is estimated when the group variable version of the 
model is correct, there is no loss of information in the estimation. Estimates 
o the coefficients of non-grouped variables are the same as those obtained 
from the group variable version of the model. Each dummy variable coeffi­
cient for a particular group is equal to the sum of each group variable times 
its estimated coefficient for a particular group. Second, if the group variable 
version of a model is estimated when the dummy variable version is correct, 
there may be a problem with omitted variable bias. Finally, if the group 
variable model is estimated when the dummy variable model is correct, the 
explanatory power of the group variable model is less than that of the 
dummy variable model unless the number of included group variables is 
equal to the number of groups.
The model containing a full set of group dummy variables can be 
written
y =  X  ft +  D& +  e ( 2)
where y is an n X 1 vector of values of the dependent variable, n is the 
number of observations, X  is an n X k matrix of independent variables 
without a column of ones, D is an «  X s matrix of dummy variables where r 
is the number of groups, £ is a random disturbance vector, and /? and © are
k X 1 and j  X  1 vectors of unknown parameters. Estimation by OLS 
yields 3
P =  H - l X ' y - H - l X ' D ( D ' D r ' D ' y  (2)
0  =  -  (D'D)~1 D '  XH ~ 1 X ' y  +  (D'D)- 1 D '  y +
+  (D 'D )-1 D ' X H ~1 X ' D  (D 'D )-1 D'y 
where H  =  (X 'X  -  X'D  (D 'D )"1 D'X).
The model including group variables can be written
y =  Xß +  (DG) r  +  ß (3)
where, y, X, /?, and D are previously defined. G is an j  X r matrix of 
constants, r <  r, which transforms the matrix of dummy variables D into 
a matrix of group variables, F  is an r X 1 vector of coefficients for the 
group variables, and fi is a random disturbance vector. If R — G ' D ' DG
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and 5 =  (X 'X  -  X' DGRr1 G'D'X), estimation of the group variable 
model by OLS yields
P — S~x X 'y  -  S~x X' DGR~1 G' D 'y  (4)
f  =  -  R~ 1 G' D' XS~ 1 X 'y  +  R~l G 'D 'y  +
+  R - 'G 'D 'X S - 'X 'D G R - 'G 'D 'y
Equations (1) and (3) represent competing formulations of a model. 
Any researcher who uses group variables also has the option of using group 
dummy variables. Next the implications of estimating one formulation
when the other is correct are determined.
If the model including the dummy variables, (1), is estimated when the 
model containing the group variables, (3), is correct, it is easily shown that
G~r =  & P =  P (5)
This result follows immediately once it is realized that estimating (1) when 
(3) is correct simply amounts to a reorganization of terms in (3). The model 
estimated by OLS is
y =  XP +  D (G D  +  n (6)
The estimators for P and G f  are exactly the same as those given in (2). 
Even if the dummy variable model is estimated when the group variable 
formulation is correct, the estimator for p is the same unbiased estimator 
that results from estimating the dummy variable formulation. GT is also 
an unbiased estimator of 0 . The sum of each group variable multiplied 
by the associated group coefficient yields the dummy variable coefficient 
for that group. This is an intuitive result. Each individual in a group is 
assigned one value, regardless of how many group variables are included. 
If all group information is included in one value, the best value to assign 
is the coefficient of the dummy variable for the particular group.
There are more severe problems if the group variable formulation is 
estimated when the dummy variable formulation is correct^ If (3) is esti­
mated when (1) is correct, the expected values of P and F  are given by
E{~P) =  P +  S~l X '  D&-  X '  DGR-1 G' D' D0  (7)
E( f )  =  [R~1 G' D’ D — Rrl G' D' XS~1 X' D +
+  R- 1 G' jy  X S - 1 X ' DGR- 1 G' jy  D ]0
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As is the case when omitted variables are a problem, the estimators are 
biased and inconsistent unless the omitted variables are uncorrelated with 
the included variables The bias also disappears if G is of full rank, 
that is if there are as many group variables in the model as there are 
groups * 2. Then, there are no omitted group effects, G  is of full rank, R r1 =  
G~ ' (D' D )~1 G'~ \  and the expressions above simplify to
E ( h = P  (8)
E (T) =  G ~l©
There is an additional consequence of estimating the group variable 
formulation when the dummy variable formulation is correct -  the R2 of the 
model must be less than or equal to the R2 of the model including a full set 
of dummy variables. The equality holds only if the number of group vari­
ables included in the model is equal to the number of groups.
This result can be established by comparing the sums of squared resid­
uals for the two formulations, since the total sum of squares is the same for 
each. For the model including a full set of dummy variables, the matrix of 
explanatory variables is Z =  [X  D ], and the sum of squared errors is given 
by
SSE j =  y'Mjy (9)
where Md - l n - Z  (Z' Z)~x Z’. A result due to Amemiya (1985, p. 461) 
allows Z (Z' Z r 1 Z' to be written,
z  (Z' z r  Xz ' =  x  (x ' x r 1 r  +  m x d  (D' m x d )- 1 d 'm x ( io )
where Mx =  In — X  (X ' X )~1 X'. Thus SSEd can be written
SSEd =  / [ / „  -  X  (X 'X )- xX ' -  Mx D (D 'M x D )-l D 'M x}y (11)
For the model including the group variables, the matrix of explanatory 
variables is R =  [X  DG]. The sum of squared errors for this model is given 
by
SSEg = y 'M gy (12)
where Mg ~  In — R (R' R )~l R'. Once again applying Amemiya’s result,
See Maddala (1977, pp. 156), for a discussion of the problems caused by omitting var­
iables.
2 In two P»P"s. Moulton (1986) and Moulton (1987), the problem of correlation caused 
by not accounting for group effects is addressed.
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R (R 'R )~ l R' =  X f X ' X r ' r  +  MXDG (G' D ' Mx DG)~l G' D' Mx (13)
The sum of squared residuals for the group variable model can be written as
ssEg = /[/„- x (x'xr'x'
-  MXD G (G 'D 'M XDG)~1 G 'D 'M x}y (14)
The difference between the sums of squared residuals is
SSEg -  SSEd =  /  [Mx D (D' Mx D )~1 D' Mx
- M x D G (G 'D 'M x D G )-1G 'D 'M x]y  (15)
The matrix in this quadratic form is idempotent and therefore the quadratic 
form is positive semidefinite. This impies that
SEEg - S S E d ^ 0  (16)
This result proves that the R2 of the model including group variables as 
regressors can be no larger than the R2 of the model containing a full set of 
dummy variables. If the matrix G  is of full rank, that is there are as many 
group variables as groups, the R2’s of the models are equal. This is true 
because if G  is of full rank,
(G ' DMX D G E 1 — G *1 (D' Mx D )~1 G '~1 (17)
and the quadratic form in (14) collapses to a zero matrix. A model contain­
ing a full set of group dummy variables has a higher R2 than a model contain­
ing group regressors, and the model containing group variables can only do 
as well as the dummy variable model if the number of group variables 
included is equal to the number of groups.
Implications
The implications of the previous section for empirical research can be 
neatly broken down into four cases. The model including group regressors is 
either properly specified, or there are omitted group effects. Each of these 
cases is examined by assuming that the group variables are included either 
to satisfy ceteris paribus assumptions, or to estimate parameters of interest.
Suppose that the model given in (3) is correct, so the model including 
the group variables is properly specified. Also, suppose that the group 
variables are included to satisfy ceteris paribus assumptions. Then estimation
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with group variables and estimation with group dummies yields the same 
result. The estimates of the parameters of interest, /?, are the same, as are 
the jR2’s of the models. If the number of group variables included in the 
model is smaller than the number of groups, estimation of the group varia­
ble formulation does save degrees of freedom. The consequence is that the 
standard errors of the parameters of interest are smaller than those obtained 
by estimating the dummy variable formulation. However, this gain is usual­
ly quite small since data sets in which group effects are estimated are usually 
very large. Thus the results of the two models are identical except for a loss 
of degrees of freedom if the dummy variable formulation is estimated, the 
consequences of which are usually negligible.
Suppose that the group variables are included to satisfy ceteris paribus, 
but some group effects are omitted. Not only is the explanatory power of 
the group regressor model less than the explanatory power of the dummy 
variable model, there are other problems as well. Omitting group effects 
leads to biased and inefficient estimation of the parameters of interest if the 
omitted variables are correlated with the included ones. Even if the omitted 
variables are not correlated with the included variables, their omission leads 
to inflated standard error estimates for those variables, and the tests of 
significance are too conservative. The seriousness of these problems pro­
vides sufficient justification to estimate the dummy variable model instead.
The implications from the analysis above are clear. The dummy varia­
ble model can do no worse than the group variable model, and it can do 
better. The R2 of the dummy variable model is at least as large as the R2 of 
the group variable model. Estimation of the dummy variable model avoids 
the potential problem of omitted variable bias in the estimation of the 
parameters of interest. Therefore, when group variables are included solely 
to satisfy ceteris paribus assumptions, group dummy variables instead of 
group variables should be included in the regression model.
The problem is not so easy to solve if the coefficients of the group 
variables are the parameters of interest. Estimation of the dummy variable 
model is no longer an option. Once more, there are two cases to consider. 
The first is based on the assumption that the group variable specification is 
correct, and the second is based on the assumption that there are omitted 
group effects.
If the group variable model is correctly specified, the choice is simple. 
The group variable model and the dummy variable model give the same 
results, but the dummy variable model does not permit the estimation of 
group parameters of interest, and is therefore not an option. However, 
researchers usually do not know if their models are properly specified. If the
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group variable regression has been misspecified, omitted variable bias may 
result.
When the coefficients of the group variables are the parameters of 
interest, the dummy variable model is not an option, and a statistical test for 
the presence of omitted group effects is required. Such a test is easy to 
implement once it is recognized that the group variable model, (3), is a 
constrained version of the dummy variable model, (1). Recall that if the 
model contains as many group variables as there are groups, the result is the 
same as if the dummy variable model had been estimated. The implication is 
that if the model of interest contains r group variables, at most s — r dummy 
variables can also be included. These variables together span the dummy 
variable space. Thus, the group variable model is a constrained version of 
the dummy variable model, with zero restrictions on the coefficients of some 
dummy variables. The presence of omitted group effects can be tested by 
including s — r dummy variables in the group variable model, and then 
jointly testing the significance of the dummy variable coefficients using the 
F-test for linear restrictions \  The test statistic is
(SSEe- S S E d) / ( s - r )  _  p (lg)
{SSEd)/{n — k — s) ~  s- r’ n- k- s
where SSE  , SSEd, n, k, s and r are as previously defined. The null hypothe­
sis is that mere are no omitted group effects, and the alternative hypothesis 
is that there are omitted group effects. If the null hypothesis is accepted, the 
group variable model can be used to make inferences on parameters of 
group variables. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the problems arising from 
omitted group effects are serious, and inferences based on parameters in the 
model should be viewed with suspicion. The solution to this problem is 
simple. The omitted group effects can be included by estimating the group 
variable model with the s-r dummy variables added. This hybrid model 
permits estimation of group parameters of interest, and controls for other 
group effects.
An Application
To demonstrate the propositions outlined in the previous sections of 
this paper, the model of co-authorship estimated by Barnett, Ault, and 
Kaserman (BAK) (1988) is re-estimated and compared to the dummy 
variable version of their model. The hybrid model suggested in the previous
’ This test is similar to the RESET family of tests, Ramsey (1969). Here the test variables are 
the group dummy variables.
GROUP EFFECTS IN REGRESSION MODELS 679
section is also estimated. BAK used pooled time-series and cross-section 
data to estimate the relationship between the number of co-authors and 
several regressors. One of the regressors, SUB, is the number of submissions 
to the AER in a given year. This variable takes on the same value for every 
article in a particular ‘group’, in this case the group is a year. The BAK 
model is re-estimated along with a model that includes a dummy variable 
for each year.
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 1 4. As expected, 
the R2 of the dummy variable version of the model is .0533 which is over 
60%  larger than the R2 of the model BAK estimate. Also, the MSE of the 
dummy variable model is lower than the MSE of the BAK model, so the 
loss of degrees of freedom is not a serious problem.
In the case of the BAK model, the coefficient of the group variable, 
SUB, is a parameter of interest. The coefficient of SUB is necessary to 
permit testing of BAK’s diversification hypothesis. Thus, the dummy varia­
ble model is not an option. Since the group variable version must be esti­
mated, it is important to be certain that there are no omitted “year” effects.
In order to make that assessment, the BAK model is tested against the 
hybrid. The test statistic, F  =  2.2, exceeds the critical value of F  at the 
a =  .01 level of significance, suggesting that there are omitted group effects. 
However, since the hybrid formulation accounts for all group effects, the 
results of the hybrid estimation can be compared to the group variable 
model to determine how large an effect the omitted group variables had on 
the estimates of parameters in the BAK model. The results of the two 
models are very similar. None of BAK’s hypotheses can be disputed. 
However, the results of the statistical test indicate the presence of omitted 
group effects. BAK did not test for the existence of these effects. Fortunate­
ly, when the effects are controlled, BAK’s hypotheses are confirmed.
Conclusions
Often in applied econometric research, economists estimate regression 
models based on samples that include regressors which only vary from 
group to group. If the group information is included to satisfy ceteris paribus 
assumptions, the dummy variables should be used instead of group vari­
ables. The explanatory power of the dummy variable model is at least as *
* In the discussion in the text, the models did not have intercept terms. In the table, the 
intercept is estimated and one group dummy variable is omitted.




BAK Model Dummy Variables Hybrid
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio
NOTE -  0.0794 -  3.059 -  0.0839 -  3.232 -  0.0839 -  3.232
EMP 0.1371 4.828 0.1522 5.329 0.1522 5.329
TE 0.1109 3.379 0.1053 3.212 0.0153 3.212
ACK -  0.0093 -  2.447 -  0.0117 -  3.087 -  0.0117 -  3.087
LEAD 0.0766 1.315 0.0819 1.411 0.0819 1.411
SUB 0.0004 6.478 - - 0.0005 3.696
INTERCEPT 1.0675 20.868 1.1714 13.792 1.0245 8.563
YR1 - - 0.0859 0.736 0.0705 0.617
YR2 - - -  0.0487 -  0.410 -  0.0471 -  0.396
YR3 - - 0.1265 1.071 0.0983 0.864
YR4 - - 0.0649 0.595 -  0.0177 -  0.184
YR5 - - 0.0752 0.686 -  0.0014 -  0.015
YR6 - - 0.0202 0.184 -  0.0730 -  0.767
YR7 - - 0.0508 0.474 -  0.0865 -  0.994
YR8 - - 0.1190 1.172 -  0.0732 -  0.980
YR9 - - 0.0851 0.864 -  0.1716 -  2.539
YR10 - - 0.1149 1.176 -  0.2061 -  3.013
YR11 - - 0.1661 1.691 -  0.1198 -  1.771
YR12 - - 0.1596 1.668 -  0.7359 -  1.148
YR13 - - 0.2270 2.291 -  0.0196 -  0.433
YR14 - - 0.2114 2.162 -  0.0266 -  0.396
YR15 - - 0.1764 1.789 -  0.0717 -  1.049
YR16 - - 0.2327 2.375 0.0096 0.141
YR17 - - 0.2158 2.185 -  0.0047 -  0.068
YR18 - - 0.2712 2.731 0.0726 1.021
YR19 - - 0.1946 1.985 -  0.0413 -  0.614
YR20 - - 0.3498 3.605 0.1555 2.279
YR21 - - 0.2751 2.791 0.0046 0.068
YR22 - - 0.3198 3.269 0.0301 0.452
YR23 - - 0.2681 2.750 -  0.0812 -  1.168
YR24 - - 0.4286 4.437 0.0852 1.264
YR25 - - 0.3599 3.696 — _
R2 .0331 .0533 0.0533
MSE 0.3136 0.3100 0.3100
great as the explanatory power of the group variable model. Also the poten­
tial biases due to omitted group effects are avoided. If the coefficients of the 
group variables are parameters of interest, the dummy variable model is not
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an option. The group variable model must be estimated, but omitted varia­
ble bias is a possibility. In order to make certain the omitted group effects 
are not a problem, use of the statistical test proposed here is suggested. If 
the null hypothesis (no omitted group effects) is accepted, then inferences 
can safely be based on the coefficients of the model. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, the researcher can not test the hypotheses with the model esti­
mated, and should include additional dummy variables to account for o- 
mitted group effects.
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EFFETTI DI GRUPPO IN MODELLI DI REGRESSIONE
Lo scopo di questo articolo è di esaminare le proprietà dei modelli econome­
trici che includono variabili di gruppo come regressori e confrontarli con quelli
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che invece usano come regressori variabili dummy di gruppo. Ogni studioso che 
usa variabili di gruppo potrebbe anche usare dummy di gruppo. Se 1 informazio­
ne sul gruppo viene inclusa nel modello di regressione soltanto per soddisfare 
condizioni ceterii paribus, allora si dovrebbero includere variabili dummy di 
gruppo anziché variabili di gruppo. Le variabili dummy spiegano per lo meno 
altrettanta variazione quanto i regressori di gruppo.
Inoltre, se si usano variabili dummy viene eliminata la possibilità di omette­
re importanti variabili di gruppo. La situazione è un poco diversa se le variabili 
di gruppo sono incluse per stimare parametri importanti. Allora il modello con 
variabili dummy non è adatto. Il pericolo di omettere rilevanti variabili di grup­
po esplicative rimane un problema, ma si può usare un test statistico per determi­
nare la gravità del problema.
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A FORECASTING MODEL FOR OIL-RESERVE: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE UK-NORTH SEA
by
D ip a k  R. B a s u  *
Introduction
In view of the recent international developments in the Middle East 
there is a revival of interests on the effect of oil prices on the supply, 
extraction and discovery process of oil fields (Pesaran, 1990). Although 
recent literatures have incorporated both economic and engineering ap­
proaches, we have not seen any analysis regarding future discoveries of oil 
fields and their forecasting methods. The purpose of this paper is to incor­
porate economic, geological and engineering information in the analysis of 
forecasting future discoveries of oil fields and to apply the method for the 
specific case of the continental shelf of the UK’s North Sea. (We restrict our 
analysis for discoveries in a particular area). According to export opinion 
world recoverable oil resources could be as high as 4.2 X 1012 barrels or as 
low as 1.35 X 1012 barrels (see Energy Technologies for the UK, Voi 1, 
HMSO; and UK oil and gas guide, Arthur Anderson). Using current technol­
ogy we can extract about 35-45 percent of the available recoverable depos­
its of oil. In the case of the UK the present reserve of recoverable oil in the 
North Sea is about 1500 million tons. The whole of the North Sea has not 
yet been explored but from past experience we can formulate prediction for 
potential recoverable reserves. Regarding North Sea, studies of Odell and 
Rosing (1976) and Barouch and Kaufman (1976) provide examples of the 
kinds of forecasting models that can be developed with even minimum 
amount of data. The model developed below aims at taking into account the 
discovery process of an oil field, and incorporates the assessment of the 
possible risk of the explorer and the influence of different economic vari-
Institute of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Kent, Canterbury (U.K.).
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ables on the decision to explore. (Thus we are not considering the produc­
tion and exploitation process).
The petroleum prospective areas of the world consist of sedimentary 
basins and geosynclines not too intensely deformed tectonically, including 
the continental shelves down to 200 metres depth. Certain oceanic areas 
beyond the continental shelves -  continental slope -  have petroleum pros­
pects, but their eventual development may be delayed by 10-20 years. The 
major areas that should be considered for petroleum exploration appear to 
have already been outlined in the world. Yet the appraisal of the extent of 
these areas is very conservative, often underestimating what is revealed by 
subsequent exploratory work.
Certain concepts are important for our analysis. (See also Figure 1 for
F igure 1 Classification of wells by geologists
Note: Proved reserves are established by the producing wells (P). Unproved reserves in the 
field will require additional drilling by wells 3, 4, 5 and 6. Wildcat [random] explorato­
ry drilling can find undiscovered resources in adjacent pools or in separate fields (1 and 
2 ).
certain concepts regarding explorations). First, we have the initial oil in 
place (OIP) that, in the amount prior to any exploitation, is in undiscovered 
and discovered fields. Obviously, the OIP is difficult to estimate. As for the 
undiscovered (unknown) fields, an estimate has to be made based on the 
discovered (known) fields in relation to the geological setting.
This would not be too difficult if the unknown fields belonged to the 
same geological groups as the known fields, or if both known and unknown
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fields belonged to a known statistical population. Perhaps the best one can 
hope for with respect to the OIP value is to establish lower bounds for it 
and to raise the lower bound whenever wider knowledge about the petro­
leum geology of the region considered justifies it. The second concept is that 
of recoverable resources; that is, the amount of oil which can be recovered 
within technological and economic limits from both undiscovered and dis­
covered fields. This is often denoted as the estimated ultimate recovery 
(EUR). The relative amount of oil that is recoverable varies greatly. At the 
moment, a figure of 40 per cent probably represents a target figure for this 
phase of recovery (see Grossling, 1976). Third is the concept of proved 
reserves. Proved reserves, designated here as R v are defined as the amount 
of petroleum which can be extracted from explored acreage within present 
economic and technological limits. Then, we have the concept of expanded 
proved reserve (R2) that represents the expected amounts of oil from revi­
sions and extensions of discovered fields. We deal here with a different kind 
of uncertainty, the speculation that some petroleum may exist beyond the 
known parts of fields and as extensions of them. Grossling (1976) made the 
following generalisations. An additional quantity equal to the proved reserve 
can be obtained with a probability of 0.8 and another equal additional 
quantity with a probability of 0.5. Hence the expected value of the ex­
panded proved reserve designated here as R2 would be 1 R l +  0.8R, +
0.5Rt =  2.3R v This appears too optimistic. This might have been true 
when Grossling made his studies, but with more refined values of today 
the function may no longer hold.
In our model the explorer would want to maximise his probabilistic 
net benefits arising out of success in exploration ventures, and hence would 
determine the optimum expenditures in explorations depending on the 
success year by year. With the optimum expenditures we work through the 
system we can derive the future numbers of oil fields to be discovered, their 
probabilities, the size distributions of the future discoveries and the total 
size of the discoveries. The net benefit function depends on particular as­
sumptions regarding future prices of oil, rate of interest and rate of taxation, 
and the explorer’s subjective assessments regarding risk (simply speaking, 
the discount rate). We will also try to see how changes in these assumptions 
can influence exploration decisions and the future discoveries of oil reserves.
1. — A Discovery Process Model
We can find search expenditure per square kilometre by dividing the
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total search expenditure by the area (A,) under operation in a particular 
period. Dividing the total search expenditure per square metre by the cost of 
exploratory drilling per metre, we get an approximation to the amount of 
exploratory drilling meterage per square kilometre area. We assume the 
amount of exploratory drilling meterage implies the depth of drilling at a 
particular site, although there may be other geological factors which we 
ignore for the sake of simplicity. The depth of drilling may imply the level 
of activity regarding exploration. In addition to drilling costs, there has to 
be a seismic survey.
The amount of exploratory drilling meterage implies the intensity of 
the process and the number of site locations under our assumptions. Given a 
site location, whether or not the location is drilled depends on the success 
ratio the searcher thinks there could be. The success ratio depends not only 
on the intensity of the search, but also on the growing geological knowledge 
about the hydrocarbon locations in the sedimentary rocks. The effects of 
depletion on the existing stock in the earth are also important. If the region 
is mature, then the effects of exhaustion cannot be neglected. On the other 
hand, the effect of increased geological knowledge on discoveries is proba­
bly greatest in the early stages of exploration and diminishes as the region 
matures. We accept here that the cumulative drilling meterage can be consid­
ered as a measure of the amount of accumulated knowledge and as a 
measure of the state of maturity and therefore exhaustion of the region. We 
therefore accept the following functional equation to determine the success 
ratio.
Z, =  a D,exp [a -  /? (cl_ l -  K)2] (1)
where
Zt =  success ratio in exploration in T
number of successful wells drilled in period t 
total number of wells drilled in period t 
Dt =  amount of exploratory drilling footage 
c, =  cumulative exploratory drilling footage in the period (/ — 1) 
a =  a constant to be estimated
As ct_ j grows towards K, the success ratio rises, because of both the 
intensity of the process and growing geological knowledge; but with increas­
ing discovery efforts the number of wells in that area is becoming ex­
hausted. So when ct_ x exceeds K, the success ratio begins to fall as exhaus­
tion effects begin to dominate. Early in an exploration programme, before
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much knowledge has been accumulated, a unit increase in the drilling foot­
age (Dt) leads to a smaller increase in Zt than does a unit increase in Dt when 
ct_ 1 is near K. Once the critical point, K, is passed and exhaustion begins to 
dominate, unit increases in Dt lead to smaller and smaller increases in Zt. So 
as ct_ j becomes larger, Zt passes through a point of inflexion and asymptoti­
cally approaches zero. The success ratio actually determines the mean rate of 
the discovery. By mean rate, we mean the number of fields discovered in 
each year on average during the process of our calculation. (On average, 
drilling a well takes 2-3 months, so a well may have started last year, giving 
success this year. Thus, we have to take the average over two consecutive 
years within the period of consideration). We assume that the mean rate 
depends negative exponentially on the success rate. The reason is that the 
success ratio refers to a successful well, which may or may not lead to new 
fields in every case because even if the drill hits oil, the well could be 
proved very thin in hydrocarbon or could be just another extension of the 
old field already discovered, if the strikes are very close. So we have the 
following relationships:
Xt =  a x exp (Z'f +  fly (2)
where X, is the mean rate of the discovery of oil fields and n is a normally 
distributed noise variable with E (fj.x) =  0 and var (fxx) =  r \ .  This may be 
a simplified picture, but a number of authors have tried this type of function 
to explain the rate of discoveries (see Uhler, 1970; Barouch and Kaufman, 
1976; Allais, 1957).
Once we can calculate Zt, the probability of success in drilling, we can 
estimate the mean number of oil fields to be discovered in that period. The 
next question is to analyse how the amounts discovered in each field might 
be different over the period of an exploration programme. The mean size of 
discoveries in most cases tends to decline (Uhler, 1970). The usual way to 
incorporate the phenomenon is to fit a log normal curve with respect to the 
cumulative drilling footage, assuming the size per reservoir is a long normal­
ly distributed random variable. So we get:
log (SZO JX,) =  log by -  Yi ct_ ! +  n2 (3)
where [x2 is a random noise variable normally distributed with E  (fj,2) =  0 
and var (/t2) =  r 2, and SZO is the total size of the reservoir discovered and 
Yi is a parameter to be estimated. We can very easily derive the expected 
size of the reservoir discovered as
E (SZOJX,) =  by exp (-  Yi ct_y +  r\/2) (4)
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Equation (3) gives the equation for the average size of the reservoir of oil, 
and Equation (4) gives the expected value of the average size of the discov­
ery. Thus we get the total size of the reservoir discovered as:
E  (SZO,) =  I E  (.SZOJX,) E  (X,) (5)
2. — Estimation of the Discovery Process Model
Most of the data needed to estimate the above model of this behaviour 
equation are obtained from a) detailed information provided by different oil 
companies and b) from the Energy Digest of the UK. The time series data 
set spans for the period between 1963 to 1988.
One more equation is added to the above set, for the area under 
operation. The area under operation is now about 60,000 square km. The 
area is found, empirically, to be related only to the changes in the price of 
oil and the success rate in the previous year (see D ’Ancona, 1988 for further 
supports).
The estimation of the behaviour equations have been done by 2SLS 
(two stage least square) assuming first order autocorrelation of the distur­
bance; so the disturbances are generated according to the following scheme:
£, =  pe,_l +  fi,
when ti, is a normally and independently distributed random variable with 
mean zero and variance T2 that is assumed to be independent of £,_x; that is 
u, — N  (0, a2u) for all t. We have also: E  (u„ us) — 0 for all t ^  s\ 
E  (u, e ,_x) — 0 for all t\ e, =  N  [0, r  u ( 1 — p2)]; cov (£, £,_ t) =  pa2 where 
var (et) — a2.
The estimates of the stochastic equations are as follows (figures in 
brackets are the estimated ¿-statistics and p is the degree of autocorrelation 
present).
Area under operation
A, =  34127.091 +  177.274 [PO,/PO,_x] +  12.531 Z ,_x- [ i l (3.1) 
(2.07) (2.01) (1.87)
»  =  21, R2’ =  0.76, DW =  1.93, var (nx) =  1.92, p =  0.32
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Probability of success
Z, =  1.110 D , - 0.076 exp [-0 .0 0 2  (c,_1-2 5 .9 0 4 )2] +  p 2 (3.2) 
(1.37) (2.01) (1.05) (1.79)
Mean rate of discoveries
(3.07)
R2 =  0.79, DW =  1.84,
Expected average size
log {SZOJX,) =  1.805 -  0.006 ct_ x +  p 4 (3.4)
(1.39) (1.87)
R2 =  0.76, DW  =  2.08, var (p4) =  1.48, p =  0.21
Autocorrelation is present significantly in a number of equations ex­
cept (3.3). The stochastic simulation carried out through the error terms 
have reduced the possible forecast errors of the equations. As the residuals 
have gone through several simulations, these are expected to be stable under 
possible sampling fluctuations.
3. — forecasting
Our basic problem is to forecast the total size of the oil fields to be 
discovered. Because that depends on the exploration efforts, which in turn 
depends on the amount of expenditure on research procedure, the problem 
here is to determine what would be the size of the discoveries under a 
specific assumption regarding the future expenditures. For that purpose 
three alternative scenarios regarding future expenditure were assumed for 
the period between 1989 and 1999.
Other assumptions are that the rate of tax on the discovered reserves 
will be constant and the rate of discount will be 15 percent throughout the
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Table 1
SCENARIO: PRICE OF CRUDE OIL (US $ barrel)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
1989 18.0 18.5 18.0
90 18.5 19.5 18.0
91 19.0 20.5 17.5
92 19.0 21.5 17.0
93 19.5 22.5 17.0
94 19.5 23.0 16.5
95 20.0 23.5 16.5
96 20.0 24.5 17.0
97 20.5 25.0 17.0
98 21.0 26.0 17.5
99 21.0 26.5 18.0
period. In the standard scenario oil price will be either constant or will grow 
at a very insignificant rate (see Table 1), at constant 1989 prices. In scena­
rio 2, an optimistic phase for the oil price is assumed, whereas in scenario 3 
a pessimistic phase regarding oil price is assumed. It is essential to mention 
that these assumptions are not based on any particular type of mathematical 
expectation, but on author’s own expectations regarding the future price of 
oil under alternative scenarios. The reference price for oil is that of Brent 
light crude in Rotterdam. For each of these three scenarios, from the solu-
Table 2
FUTURE EXPENDITURE ON SEARCH FOR OIL FIELDS (in 1988 prices)
(£ million)
Year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
1989 390.6 390.6 390.6
90 368.3 372.5 360.1
91 362.7 385.9 356.5
92 334.8 398.7 325.5
93 320.8 407.5 310.7
94 304.1 415.5 292.5
95 287.3 419.8 265.7
96 270.6 422.4 257.5
97 253.8 425.9 241.2
98 217.6 427.1 205.9
99 198.1 431.5 175.4
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tion of the process the total size of the discovered oil revenue, the probabili­
ty of success in drilling, the area which would be covered and future drilling 
metre per square km can be derived. The results show the discovery rates 
will fall over time unless oil price will go up (as in scenario 2). These 
demonstrate that the depressed oil price cannot provide enough incentives 
towards exploration in a field which is already on its declining path; 
however an optimistic scenario regarding oil price can change the picture 
dramatically, although the total sizes of discoveries will be low; in Table 3,




Year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
1989 21 21 21
90 17 17 17
91 17 20 15
92 13 18 10
93 12 15 10
94 10 15 10
95 10 16 7
96 10 16 7
97 5 18 5
98 5 15 5
99 5 15 5
scenario 1 and 2 give insignificant discoveries beyond 1995; even scenario 2 
does not improve the picture very much which implies the success rate in 
future will be very low. However to calculate the future stock of oil reserves 
one has to calculate the appreciation of the already discovered stock and the 
future stock. Appreciation occurs due to increased knowledge of the field as 
the extraction continues over the years. The appreciation factor varies be­
tween 40 and 60 percent, but it is quite probable that during the life time 
of a well it could appreciate by about 4 to 6 times.
Conclusion
The above model presents a forecasting process in which a rational 
investor searching for oil can decide how much to invest, given the uncer­
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tain nature of the outcome and the depleting stocks of the reserve. A small 
econometric model was estimated and solved which shows the behaviour of 
several important variables such as rate of drilling, number of new discover­
ies, size of discoveries, drilling metre per square km etc. Because the model 
was estimated from the North Sea data, it represents realistic behaviour of 
the geological and economic systems. Considering the sensitivity of the 
results future price of oil is the most influential factor to determine further 
expenditures on search for oil.
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UN MODELLO PER LA PREVISIONE DELLE RISERVE PETROLIFERE: 
STUDIO PER IL MARE DEL NORD BRITANNICO
Il modello usato in questo articolo presenta un processo di previsione con il
A FORECASTING MODEL FOR OIL-RESERVE 693
quale un investitore razionale che fa della ricerca petrolifera può decidere quanto 
investire, data la natura incerta del risultato e la sempre più scarsa quantità di ri­
serve. Si stima e si risolve un piccolo modello econometrico che mostra il compor­
tamento di molte variabili importanti come il saggio di perforazione, il numero di 
nuove scoperte, la loro dimensione, i metri di perforazione per metro quadrato 
ecc. Poiché il modello è stato stimato coi dati del Mare del Nord, esso rappresen­
ta un comportamento realistico dei sistemi geologici ed economici. Considerando 
la sensibilità dei risultati, il prezzo futuro del petrolio è il fattore più importante 
per determinare ulteriori spese in ricerca petrolifera.
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AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM 
IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
by
Robert H. Wessel *
In the last century, Russia was the largest grain exporter in the world. 
Although conditions have changed greatly since the Communist takeover 
seventy years ago, agriculture still plays a dominant role in its economy, 
accounting for at least 22 percent of its GNP and employing over 34 
percent of its work force (Economist, April 11, 1992, p. 71). The decline of 
the former Soviet Union from world leadership in farming reflects both 
organizational faults and improper motivation. Since agriculture must play a 
leading role in the post-communist economies of Russia and Eastern Eur­
ope, it is essential to undertake an evaluation of what it has been and what it 
should be in the first non-communist years as well as a future likely to be 
dominated by biotechnology and genetic engineering.
Those in charge of the Soviet economy were always preoccupied with 
the economies of scale. This was particularly true in agriculture where
26,000 giant state-owned farms occupied over 97 percent of its available 
land space. So-called state farms averaged 17,000 hectares in area in 1980 
while collective farms, also state-owned, usually encompassed about 6,500 
hectares (Johnson and Brooks, 1983, p. 4). These large units typically had 
more than 500 workers per farm. In unsuccessfully seeking the economies 
of scale, they far outdistanced the large agribusiness units found in the U.S. 
today. The balance of pre-breakup Soviet farm units were small garden-type 
plots, usually operated by those employed on the large state or collective 
farms. About 38 million of these plots occupied a mere 3 percent of the 
land. Compared to the U.S., however, Soviet agriculture was labor-intensive 
rather than capital-intensive, employing five times as many laborers but only 
half as many tractors. The tractors used, however, were enormous, usually
University of Cincinnati, Department of Economics, Cincinnati, OH (U.S.A.).
696 ROBERT H. WESSEL
the size of a tank and thus are well adapted only to very large scale 
operations. By world rather than U.S. standards their agriculture and espe­
cially their grain production would be rated capital-intensive.
The old Soviet Union had about 232,426,000 hectares of crop land as 
opposed to 189,915,000 for the U.S. Employment which came to 91 per 
1000 hectares against 17 in the U.S. produced 201 million metric tons of 
grains compared to 284 in the U.S. Over 14 percent of their labor force was 
directly employed in agriculture compared with 2.5 percent in the U.S. 
while in excess of one-third of their workers are involved in the production, 
processing and distribution of farm products in contrast to one-sixth in the 
U.S. In the 1986-89 period, 35 billion rubles were invested annually in 
agriculture in the Soviet Union (U.S.D.A., 1991).
The Output of Russian and Soviet Agriculture
Soviet and Russian agriculture is exceedingly inefficient producing far 
less per hectare than in other countries in comparable climate zones. They 
are relatively most efficient with wheat, their principle crops averaging in 
1990 about 2 metric tons per hectare. This compares to 1.8 metric tons in 
Canada, 1.9 in Argentina, and 2.4 in the U.S.A. When weather conditions 
are factored out, their results are reasonably comparable to the output 
achieved in the U.S.
Weather adjusted yields of grain (mostly wheat) per hectare rose 4.5 
percent from 1981-1989. This can largely be attributed to the adoption of 
“intensive” agro-technology in 1981 (U.S.D.A., 1990). This technique in­
volved the application of a balanced mix of high-yielding seeds, water, 
fertilizer, and pesticides on a smaller acreage and allowing an increased area 
to lie fallow. The area so treated rose from 3.7 million hectares in 1981 to 
43 million hectares in 1989 (Desai, 1992, p. 50). Previous increases in 
fertilizer and equipment had been more or less haphazard, producing a mere 
1.5 percent annual gain from 1965 to 1980. In cereals the USSR lagged with 
1.9 metric tons per hectare as opposed to 2.2 for Canada, 2.3 for Argentina, 
and 4.3 in the U.S. In other crops such as roots and tubers, potatoes and 
sugar beet, they were far behind. Skold and Popov found that in produdng 
corn, minor crops and vegetables Soviet farmers were far less efficient than 
in raising wheat where they achieved 83 percent of the production possible 
with the land and capital available (Skold and Popov, 1990). They also 
trailed the U.S. and others in livestock yields in relation to feed applied. 
This is attributed to a serious deficiency of protein in livestock feed and was 
occasioned by a minimal output of soybeans which can easily be turned into 
meal with high protein content.
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The Faults of Soviet Agriculture
Size. — We have noted that the Soviet preoccupation with die econo­
mies of scale led to uneconomically large state and collective farms. Experts 
on the other hand believe farms as small as 50 hectares are viable in the 
warmer and more fertile south. Although wheat, their principal crop, does 
well on larger areas, the huge size of farms in Russia runs far beyond what 
can be justified even with that crop. Russia’s estimated grain crop for 1992 
was estimated at 96 million metric ton down slightly from 97.1 in 1991.
Cooperation. — Along with dwindling supplies, farmer cooperation is 
becoming a problem. Many producers withheld supplies because of the 
relatively low price of $55 per metric ton which prevailed for much of 
1992. A large amount of this output found its way into unofficial channels 
of distribution. It is clear that the command structure of the Russian gov­
ernment was not totally effective. This is especially true where regional and 
local governments exercised significant control. This led President Yeltsin to 
order 20 thousand troops into the fields in the fall of 1992 to insure that 
most of the harvest was brought in and distributed through approved 
channels.
Pricing. — Under the system of procurement bonuses formerly used in 
the Soviet Union, large bonuses frequently were paid to inefficient farms 
with high costs and small payments were made to lower cost, more efficient 
producers. Obviously, rewarding the inefficient and penalizing the more 
effective created reverse incentives. In addition, farm wages failed to pro­
vide sufficient rewards for extra effort or quality production. Furthermore, 
agricultural prices which were set by government bureaucrats provided no 
guidelines to farm managers in selecting products mixes, methods of opera­
tion or choosing the most effective use of investment funds. This method of 
operation was only viable when supported by the elaborate system of food 
subsidies used in the past. In 1990, 48 billion rubles were paid as subsidies 
to meat production, 31 billion for milk, 7.3 billion for grain and 4.4 billion 
for potatoes (IMF, 1991).
Contamination. -  According to some estimates, 30 percent of the food 
in the former Soviet Union is contaminated by the improper selection and 
use of pesticides and fertilizers. Fertilizer use in kilograms per hectare in 
grain production increased over five fold from 8.9 kilograms in 1964 to 51 
kilograms in 1980 (Desai, 1987, p. 241). The results were devastating 
where improper agents were used. Feshbach and Friendly estimate that
14,000 persons are being killed each year by pesticides alone and 700,000 
are being made ill. Despite their toxic properties, most of the pesticides are 
ineffective and over a quarter of every harvest is lost to pests. Almost half
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of the farm land in the former Soviet Union is threatened by erosion, 160 
million hectares are saline and 25 million are water logged or swampy. In 
southern Russian Kalmykia since 1954 the desert has increased in size from
12,000 hectares to over 800,000 hectares and is growing by 40,000 hectares 
a year. Because of these factors, Feshbach and Friendly feel that it may take 
years before Russian farms can supply the population with adequate food 
and even longer before Russia can again become an international competitor 
(Feshbach and Friendly, 1992). Even if these estimates are exaggerated, 
there is no question that a serious problem exists and that the ultimate 
rehabilitation of the agricultural economy depends on successful solutions. 
Looking to the future, it will have to deal with the stresses that modern 
agricultural practices will place upon the environment and those likely to 
arise in the age of biotechnology.
Upstream Failures. -  The inadequacies and errors of the suppliers of 
the Russian and Soviet food industries have crippled productivity. We have 
noted that because of the preoccupation with size, tractors and harvesters 
are excessively large and not adapted to farming on a reasonable scale and 
that improper pesticides have routinely been supplied. This can largely be 
attributed to lack of market guidance in the decision-making process. Be­
cause Russian agriculture is relatively capital-intensive by most standards, 
farmers must borrow in order to plant their crops. Unfortunately, the 
Russian banking system is not well developed. Consequently, the flow of 
funds to farmers at appropriate times is not assured and at times totally 
lacking. The possible role of foreign sources is likely to be important, 
especially while domestic suppliers are in the process of rehabilitation.
Downstream Failures. — It is estimated that 10 percent of Russian crops 
are lost by improper harvesting in the fields and on-the-scene experts believe 
thereafter 25-30 percent of all grain is lost through bad storage. Many 
Russian grain silos, for example, contain rotting grain and are infested with 
rats (Economist, April 11, 1992, p. 72). In addition, processing plants are 
outmoded or obsolete. At least 40 percent of the sausage factories in Russia 
are classified as “ready for demolition”, while in the Ukraine, 75 percent of 
the sugar-processing plants were built before World War I and will have to 
be replaced soon. The state-owned trucking firms that haul crops are typical­
ly very inefficient and employ obsolete vehicles. Outdated processing e- 
quipment and techniques as well as shortages of packaging materials contri­
bute to additional shortfalls. Many, if not most of these failures are the 
results of government controls and administered prices. For example, when 
prices are set very low, managers pay little attention to waste. Inadequate 
government allocations of investment funds also account for much of the
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM IN THE FORMER USSR 6 9 9
shortfall and dilapidation in processing and distribution (Barkema, 1991, p.
12).
Agriculture Labor Problems. — Serious problems also exist with the 
agricultural labor force. To participate in the world agricultural markets of 
the late 20th and early 21st centuries, Russia and the rest of the former 
Soviet Union will need young well-educated computer-literate workers. Bio­
technology will greatly enhance new technical requirements. This need does 
not dove-tail at all well with the current makeup of the agricultural labor 
force. Unfortunately, the workers on many farms are old. This is particular­
ly true of northern areas where over 40 percent of the farm population is 
composed of women over the age of 55. Most are not acutely interested in 
change. This will greatly inhibit the process of altering farming methods and 
the adoption of modern techniques to enhance productivity. Such a group 
also has demonstrated lack of interest if not outright opposition to changing 
the pattern of ownership of agricultural lands and the methods of farm 
management (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991).
Reform Measures and the Chance of Success
Under the perestroika program of Gorbachev, concerted attempts were 
made to resolve the problems of Soviet agriculture. In 1990, procurement 
prices were raised with the objective of stimulating production through 
enhanced farm profits. At about the same time, procurement bonuses were 
eliminated to stop rewarding inefficiency. These measures, however, fell far 
short of what was needed because the system of outmoded government 
controls, although partially dismantled, still was controlling most decisions. 
Even after a further round of price increases in 1991, prices still were 
significantly below those set on world markets. Finally, in January 1992, 
Boris Yeltsin announced the end of most price controls on food in Russia 
and a dramatic program of privatization.
The old state-owned farm system is being largely dismantled in Russia 
and replaced by a system of private property. Private ownership of land was 
made legal by acts of its parliament along with the right to pass it along to 
heirs. Restricted rights to sale were also granted. Under this program, farm­
ers have voted on the way their state-owned farms would be disposed of. 
Those on half the farms elected either family farms units or to enter into 
farm associations where individuals would own and operate their fields but 
would share farm machinery. The latter was a compromise made necessary 
by the very large size of existing equipment. Over two-thirds of Russia’s 
farm land was given to the farmers who worked the land and the ownership 
will ultimately be evidenced by formal deeds.
700 ROBERT H. WESSEL
At the other extreme, 10 percent of the farms elected to continue with 
the old arrangement and to have the state continue to own and manage the 
firms. This approach appealed to many of the older farm operators. The 
other 40 percent chose to remain in large units which, however, were 
transformed into privately held cooperatives. They also elected provisions 
which later would enable these cooperatives to be subdivided into private 
family farms. The latter can best be viewed as a transitional arrangement 
{Economist, April 11, 1992).
Will this Restructuring Work? — It is too early to conclude that the 
drastic restructuring of agricultural production will succeed in greatly increas­
ing output. By April 1992, there were 70,000 family farms where a year 
before there were virtually none and the transition from state ownership and 
control to private operation for the rest of the farm land was proceeding 
very rapidly. But less than a year of private control does not produce an 
adequate base for proper evaluation. Nevertheless, there are several factors 
which suggest that it will achieve its objective.
Success of the Private Gardens. — We have already noted that there had 
been about 38 million garden plots on 3 percent of the land operated by 
workers primarily employed on state farms. These plots have been highly 
productive for two reasons. First, since part of their produce is sold on free 
markets, there is a strong direct incentive to produce. Second, these gardens 
concentrate on high value crops such as livestock and vegetables where they 
account for 28 percent of the milk, 60 percent of the potatoes, 35 percent of 
the poultry and one-third of the meat. One can expect that the newly 
established private farms will change their product mix to emphasize these 
more valuable crops and that profit motivation will greatly enhance their 
incentives to produce.
The Glasnost and Perestroika Period. — Before the end of the Gor­
bachev period, the institution of the reform measures created opportunities 
for collective farms to sell grain in private or cooperative outlets or to 
convert it into livestock feed where returns were higher than from sales to 
state procurement agencies at artificially low official prices. The result was 
an increase in output. These reforms also made it possible to exercise more 
discretion in crop selection. This also enhanced production. In sum, these 
developments suggest that even before state ownership had ended, opportu­
nities to follow capitalist incentives that enhance output existed (Desai, 
1992, p. 50-51).
The Chinese Experience. — A drastic alteration in the organization of 
agriculture in China began in 1978. State procurement prices were raised 22 
percent in 1979. In that same year, the movement from the collective
I
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system to one based on individual household farming began. It was com­
pleted by 1983. The results were impressive. In the ten years following 
these reforms, gross farm output increased 138 percent (Koo, 1990). To aid 
the process, control over the distribution of land was given to local authori­
ties who frequently encouraged private farming. Initially, ownership was 
conditional in that farmers were not given outright title to land but had to 
be satisfied with 15-year leases. This new system was known as the Con­
tract Responsibility System or Household Responsibility System.
In the period from 1978 to 1984, according to line production func­
tion analysis, Lin found that over 45 percent of the growth can be ex­
plained by increases in inputs. Most important was fertilizer which ac­
counted for 32 percent of the enhancement of growth. Increased capital 
accounted for another 11 percent. The household responsibility system ac­
cording to this analysis contributed over 48 percent. Using a supply re­
sponse function analysis, Lin determined that the price increase of agricultur­
al products was responsible for 16 percent of the growth and the household 
responsibility system accounted for 47 percent. It is clear that both ap­
proaches place a high evaluation on the system of organization (Lin, 1992, 
p. 46-47).
Although the results in China suggest that similar results may be 
possible in Russia, that does not necessarily follow. Although not capital-in­
tensive by American standards, Russian farming is far more capital-intensive 
than China’s. China’ farming is also much simpler and relies less on e- 
quipment and chemicals. In contrast, Russia’s farm economy is much more 
dependent on the upstream and downstream linkages. Furthermore, despite 
the fact that agricultural prices have risen more in absolute terms in Russia 
than they did in China, relative prices have not. Nevertheless, the Russian 
farm sector is one of the most flexible parts of its economic system and most 
likely to adapt reasonably quickly. Consequendy, even though a comparison 
with China does not provide direct parallels, it suggests that a similar 
though delayed reaction may well follow.
Overcoming Impediments to Rapid Modernization
Equipment Size. — We have already noted the very large size of Soviet 
tractors and other harvesting equipment. This is clearly a structural imped­
iment confronting the development of modern market agriculture. Assuming 
the state-owned farms are divided into 20 to 30 hectare plots there will be 
more than ten million farms in the former Soviet Union. Yet even at this 
size, they would require the use of tractors and harvesters in their cultiva­
tion. The ten million tractors needed would not be available in the short
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run but would take years to produce (Desai, 1992, p. 52). In the interim, 
heavy reliance on joint use plans for the large equipment would be needed 
or subdivision would have to be delayed. We have already noted that a 
sizeable portion of the farm population would opt for one of these alterna­
tives. This problem could be partially offset by importation of smaller-sized 
equipment from Western Europe and the U.S. A preferred alternative 
would be for Russia to retain reasonably large farms rather than moving 
from the excessively large to the very small. This solution would seem to 
follow the U.S. experience more closely and better enable them to meet the 
future needs of biotechnology and genetic engineering.
Upstream, Downstream Problems. — We have already noted the inade­
quacy of institutions supplying farmers and distributing their produce. 
These institutions, which had been largely ignored for generations, received 
only 15 percent of the government’s investment in agriculture for the last 
decade and now require capital infusions (Barkema, 1991, p. 72). Again, 
new technology may come to the rescue. A simple example deals with a 
small but important part of the problem. According to World Bank esti­
mates, simple efficient grain silos could be built all over Russia for less than 
$250 million and over the entire former U.S.S.R. for less than half a billion 
dollars. Clearly, this type of thing must be done but will not happen over­
night. Because of intermittent and untimely availability of goods, an inordi­
nate amount of agricultural crops is hoarded either for speculative reasons 
or to ensure future consumption. Good upstream, downstream institutional 
arrangements would eliminate the motivation for such hoarding. Along this 
line, in August 1992, Boris Yeltsin established a grain reserve to avoid 
winter grain shortages. This will also reduce speculation in grain trading and 
improve distribution to cities and other areas where supplies are inadequate.
Worker Attitudes and Skills. — Not all agricultural labor is enthusiastic 
about a subdivision and modernization of Soviet farming. We mentioned 
earlier that a high proportion of these workers are elderly and that over 40 
percent are women. Many of these people lack the strength and the desire to 
undertake the difficult job and the risk of operating a private farm. For 
example, the elderly milkmaids in the Voronezk area expressed no interest 
in owning their land (Ignatius, 1992, p. 1). A change in work tasks and the 
type of individuals performing them will be needed as Soviet agriculture is 
modernized. Almost 70 percent of the Soviet agricultural work force now 
does manual labor (U.S.D.A., 1991). Over time provision must be made for 
replacing these workers with others younger and more vigorous who will be 
more receptive to new forms of organization and methods of production. 
Another problem is former Communist bureaucrats who talk reform but
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work to thward it, as well as collective farm directors who are often unwill­
ing to help new private farmers. All these too must be replaced, which can 
take place only by attrition with the passage of long periods of time.
A considerable skepticism of the reform movement exists among agri­
cultural workers. According to the Géonomies Institute, 58 percent of Rus­
sian farmers contend they have seen no evidence of reform programs. In the 
Ukraine, 42 percent reported the same observation and in Kazakhstan 27 
percent. The Institute attributes much of this attitude to the absence of laws 
governing agriculture or the contradictions among the new laws that have 
been passed. Respondents to the Institute’s survey indicated little faith in 
the steps government has taken toward reform and in the quality of offi­
cials. Over 29 percent said their governments were not competent, 50 
percent said they were only partially competent and only 10 percent be­
lieved them to be completely competent. Obviously a change in these atti­
tudes will be essential to satisfactory long-run performance. Unhappily, 77 
percent felt the food situation was still becoming worse. Nevertheless, more 
than half support privatizing land (Géonomies Institute, 1992). Obviously 
public support must be sustained until real performances can be de­
monstrated.
Conclusion
Fundamental agriculture reforms are well underway in Russia and 
many other parts of the old Soviet Union. Many difficult structural changes, 
however, are only beginning to be implemented. This is particularly true of 
infrastructure development and building up-stream and down-stream support­
ing institutions. Although substantial foreign investments funds are needed, 
most of the important institutions are necessarily domestic and cannot be 
purchased from abroad. Some farm machinery and transportation equipment 
needed in the transition are exceptions. Food imports and humanitarian 
supplies will also be essential for years. It goes without saying that rapid 
progress must at the same time be made toward rapid macroeconomic stabili­
zation.
Finally, biotechnology is opening new frontiers in agriculture all over 
the world. Farmers will be able to produce more crops at lower prices but 
probably on larger sized farms than in the past. Many new materials will 
almost certainly take their places among agricultural products. The devel­
opment of many new agricultural pharmaceutical products may well cause 
the word to be spelled “pharms” with increasing frequency. These develop-
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ments inevitably lie ahead. Consequently, as they are beginning restructur­
ing, Russia and the other countries of the old Soviet Union should be 
preparing their adaptation to this major change (Stanley, 1991).
Eventually another type of cooperation is essential — the willingness of 
the West to accept Russian and other Soviet-made goods in the trading 
process. Here strong opposition is already building in both European com­
munity and the U.S. Many Japanese markets will also almost inevitably 
remain closed. Although certain Soviet exports will almost always be 
welcome, rare metals are prime examples, acceptance of the agricultural 
products is by no means assured. Neither the U.S. nor the EC can expect the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to enjoy the prosperity and growth 
needed for peaceful coexistence and still retain high trade barriers against 
these important goods. Fair and equitable treatment must ultimately be 
extended to a wide range of agricultural goods. Only in this way can the 
countries of the Soviet Union really become members of the broad com­
munity of nations. We have a vital stake in their success.
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SVILUPPO AGRICOLO E RIFORMA DELL’EX UNIONE SOVIETICA
L’agricoltura ha un’importanza vitale per i paesi dell’ex Unione Sovietica in 
quanto rappresenta il 22% del loro PIL e occupa un terzo della forza lavoro. Vi 
era tuttavia una estrema inefficienza nella coltivazione di tutti i prodotti tranne il 
frumento. Responsabili di questa situazione sono l’eccessiva dimensione delle 
unità agricole, la mancanza di cooperazione fra gli agricoltori, varie disfunzioni e 
l’inquinamento di vaste aree agricole.
Si sta ampiamente smantellando il vecchio sistema agricolo a proprietà sta­
tale che viene sostituito da un sistema di proprietà privata. All’inizio del 1992 vi 
erano 70.000 imprese agricole private e si sta rapidamente procedendo ad ulterio­
ri privatizzazioni. L ’esperienza fatta con piccoli appezzamenti di terra fa prevede­
re che la privatizzazione determinerà un aumento della produzione. I risultati 
ottenuti in Cina con il Contract Responsibility System confermano questa previ­
sione.
Gli investimenti in infrastrutture sono pure di importanza vitale come lo 
sono i massicci programmi di addestramento dei futuri agricoltori alle tecniche 
moderne. Inoltre, si dovranno scegliere con accuratezza dimensioni agricole suffi­
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1. Introduction
Greek manufacturing sector should be one of the triggering mechanism 
of development in the country’s target of convergence towards the European 
Community’s average macroeconomic records. However, its past history 
shows that this might be a difficult task. Greek manufacturing continues 
to occupy a relatively small share of the gross domestic product and despite 
the investment incentives and the heavy protectionism failed to grow up 
considerably (for a detailed analysis see Giannitsis, 1983).
As we can see in Table 1, manufacturing output exhibits some spells of 
high growth (around 10% ) up to 1973 but slowed down considerably 
therafter and turned even to negative growth rates during the periods 1981- 
83 and 1986-87. This resulted in relatively high manufacturing employment 
growth in the early sixties, early seventies and the 1976-79 period which 
however slowed down remarkably in the eighties. Real wages followed a 
slightly rising path in the fifties and sixties which slowed down in the 
period of dictatorship (1967-74). However in recent years, excluding the 
two years of peak rates of growth in 1975 and 1982, real wage growth 
fluctuates considerably, and negative growth signs appear more often than 
in the 1956-73 period. There are two other factors as well: the oil price 
which was shot up twice in the seventies and competitiveness which seems 
to fluctuate considerably in the years following the collapse of the fixed 
exchange rate system.
This paper attempts to provide some reflections on the determinants of 
employment, wage and price setting decisions in Greek manufacturing. For
*  Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, Salonica (Greece). 
The usual disclaimer applies.
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A (p* - p  )
1956 0.004 0.006 0.050 -  0.006 -  0.061
1957 0.004 0.080 0.066 -  0.003 0.037
1958 0.004 0.099 0.052 0.001 -  0.040
1959 0.004 0.010 -  0.012 -  0.012 -  0.041
1960 0.004 0.094 0.035 -  0.004 -  0.022
1961 0.004 0.048 0.080 -  0.003 -  0.014
1962 0.013 0.050 0.035 -  0.002 0.000
1963 0.018 0.111 -  0.003 -  0.004 -  0.053
1964 0.044 0.100 0.079 -  0.006 -  0.002
1965 0.029 0.079 0.072 -  0.001 0.011
1966 0.019 0.136 0.078 -  0.002 -  0.036
1967 -  0.008 0.026 0.099 -  0.001 -  0.012
1968 0.002 0.070 0.070 -  0.002 0.000
1969 0.032 0.107 0.065 -  0.003 -  0.012
1970 0.062 0.102 0.026 -  0.001 0.010
1971 0.058 0.095 0.048 0.015 0.029
1972 0.050 0.143 0.029 0.005 -  0.004
1973 0.023 0.148 -  0.065 0.009 -  0.024
1974 0.021 -  0.020 -  0.032 0.072 0.093
1975 -  0.013 0.044 0.137 0.005 0.067
1976 0.039 0.100 0.124 0.005 0.013
1977 0.022 0.015 0.058 -  0.003 -  0.030
1978 0.037 0.073 0.117 -  0.005 0.008
1979 0.036 0.059 -  0.005 0.007 -  0.011
1980 -  0.007 0.010 -  0.008 0.029 0.090
1981 -  0.029 -  0.013 0.008 0.011 0.017
1982 -  0.023 -  0.053 0.142 0.005 0.001
1983 0.005 -  0.004 -  0.004 -  0.003 0.043
1984 -  0.008 0.022 0.040 0.002 0.029
1985 0.028 0.012 -  0.006 -  0.002 -  0.002
1986 0.053 -  0.007 -  0.045 -  0.057 -  0.058
1987 -  0.000 -  0.021 0.031 0.009 -  0.024
1988 0.032 0.050 0.068 -  0.019 0.010
1989 0.011 0.023 0.031 0.014 0.014
1990 -  0.007 -  0.028 -  0.019 0.012 0.031
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this purpose I based on the theoretical framework analyzed by Layard and 
Nickell (1986) who model the product market in an imperfectly competitive 
ground while in labour market they allow wage setting to be determined far 
from the market ‘clearing’ conditions.
The model was estimated with annual published data for the period 
1956-90, by instrumental variables and three stage least squares techniques, 
and has been thoroughly tested for possible deviations from assumed statis­
tical properties. Thus, Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, while 
Section 3 presents the econometric specification of the model. Section 4 
analyzes the results and evaluate the model; and finally Section 5 sums up 
the conclusions.
2. The Theoretical Framework
Suppose the economy consists of a number n of identical imperfectly 
competitive firms which set prices, produce output and fix employment on 
the basis of their expectations of the demand for their output. Each firm’s 
final output is produced by a production function of constant returns to 
scale in which intermediate inputs (say energy) are separable from capital 
and labour. Hence, the /th firm’s production of value added Y, is determined 
by its capital (K,) and its labour (Nt):
Yi =  f [ j c ) K' (i)
where A is assumed to be labour-augmenting technical progress. 
Reformulating (1) we get:
which implies that the marginal product of labour equals the reciprocal of 
the marginal cost of output measured in terms of labour.
In order to choose a price and thus determine its output and em­
ployment, the firm must forecast demand. But the actual output that the 
firm expects to sell (Y?) will be less than full capacity output, since expected 
aggregate demand is only a fraction (t^) of that. If we assume for simplicity 
that output equals expected demand, then the firm’s output equals
(3 )
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We now turn to the price setting. Consider a pricing rule in which Pi is 
a mark-up v on expected marginal costs.
A
(4)
where W is the cost per worker. If the firm maximizes short-run profits,
then v 1 where x is the elasticity of demand facing the firm.
v XJ
This includes the polar cases of perfect competition (v =  1) and normal 
cost pricing (v =  0).
Moving now to the level of aggregate economy we subpress the 
model of (2), (3) and (4) to a price and an employment equation. We get 
(a) by (3) and (4) a price equation
%  =  * ,  < ? , m ,  a ) (?)
which implies that an increase of the labour-capital ratio will produce an 
increase of price over wage. We also expect d g jd t f  >  0 in all cases except 
the normal cost pricing one, where d g jd t f  =  0.
(b) by (2) and (4) we get a marginal productivity condition which generates 
an employment equation of the form
-  =  - g 2 (W/PA, f )  (6)
which suggests that when the real cost of labour increases employment falls 
relative to capital but increases when demand expectations are high.
We turn next to wage formation. I assume that either unions set wage 
(monopoly union model) or that firms and unions are bargaining over wage 
(right to manage model) but in both cases employment is fixed by employers 
(for which there will be some empirical support by the data). Thus,
“  =  ¿3 (^> K/N, P JP , P//P) (7)
which means that workers aspirations over real wages increase with the 
level of macroeconomic activity, labor productivity, and the wedge between 
real labour costs and real take-home pay (P JP ). On the other hand employ­
ers are less willing to agree on wage increases, when labour market is tight,
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labour hoarding is high, and reladve input costs (say real energy price, Pf/P) 
are increasing (see eg. Alogoskoufis and Manning, 1991).
Layard and Nickell (1986) showed that this model which is built up in 
a neo-classical framework of marginality, turns out to be quite non neo-clas­
sical in equilibrium, since wage determination is not based on market clear­
ing. To prove that, they proceed to some comparative static exercises, 
excluding priorly expected demand from wage equation, in order to shorten 
the revealed disequilibrium gap. Here, I will apply the same exercise assum­
ing only normal cost pricing conditions. The {W/P, N} space diagram 
presents the wage, employment and price decision loci at the initial equilib­
rium E0 . A temporary demand shock will shift left and upwards the wage 
curve and right and upwards the employment curve, while price setting will 
remain unaffected. Hence, there is a gap between the wage that workers 
will ask (at E\) and that (at E {) which firms are willing to pay based on 
their pricing rule. The new disequilibrium position in the E XE\ space is 
rather uncertain and this is a problem that a dynamic simulation on the 
estimated model will try to sort out.
The model we discussed determines the level of employment and out­
put for given values of the real exchange rate. However in order to define 
the long-run level of employment and output we should complement the 
model with an equation for competitiveness P*/P, where P* is the price of 
the competitive (but imperfect substitute) foreign good in domestic curren­
cy. Thus, we assume that competitiveness is determined by the demand 
conditions domestically (Y) and abroad (Y*) and a number of exogenous 
factors (say oil price in dollars Pf/E):
J  =  g4 ( Y , r , P f j E ) (8 )
3. The Empirical Framework
The theoretical model analyzed in the previous section consists of 
equations (5), (6), (7) and (8). We are going to specify and estimate the 
first three equations, leaving the effect of long-run competitiveness determi­
nation to be modelled implicitly through the instruments set. Low case 
letters are natural logarithms of capital letters.
The dynamic version of employment equation (6) has the form
n - k  =  a 0 +  a x( n - k )  +  a 2 ( w - p )  +
+  “ 3 SF iPf-p) +  a4 (p*-p)  +  a5 y ( 9 )
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where competitiveness and manufacturing output terms represent the de­
mand effects (a4, a 5 >  0), the real oil price incorporates the effect (a3 <  0) 
of the energy input price and should not be excluded despite the separability 
assumption in production function (see Oi, 1985), while the effect from real 
wage (a2 <  0) has already been discussed. sF is the share of energy input in 
gross manufacturing output, assumed constant equal to 0.07, which could 
not be far from reality (see Alogoskoufis, 1989). Technical progress will be 
assumed constant and will not be modelled explicidy. Experiments with 
residuals based approximations of technical progress were completely 
unsuccessful. The employment equation will be also estimated in an error 
correction form with the rate of change of employment An as dependent 
variable.
Wage equation (7) was estimated in both bargained wage and monopo­
ly union wage setting specifications.
w - p  -  Po +  At ( w - p )  _ i +  /?2 ( k - n )  +
+  P)(Pc~P) +  +  hy  ( 1 0 )
where /?2, /?3, /?5 >  0 and /?4 <  0. Manufacturing output was preferred as a 
measure of macroeconomic activity instead of the unemployment rate, be­
cause data for the latter is quite unreliable (see also Alogoskoufis, 1989) 
and experiments to include it in the regression were unsuccessful. Equation 
(10) is tested against the hypothesis /?3 =  /J5 =  0 for the monopoly union 
model. Wage equation includes also a linear time trend, which accounts for 
the unmodelled trending factors and in the monopoly union specification a 
AApc term accounting for price surprises.
Finally, price equation (5) is estimated in an error correction form 
which includes a constraint that ensures long-run homogeneity between 
prices and wages.
AP — To +  Ti (P ~  ( 1 -  sF) w -  sFpf )_x +  t2 (k -  n)
(Tj, t2 <  0) (11)
Price equation includes a time trend polynomial in order to account for the 
unmodelled trending factors of the model.
The system of (9), (10), (11) was initially estimated by two-stage least 
squares. As instruments I have used the {constant, time, (time)2, (AApc)_l, 
D82, D86,^ An_u (k - n ) _ lt y_v (pc- p ) _ lt {pf )_v p*_u ( w - p ) _ v y ^ } , 
where as y* was used the index of world exports in US dollar terms; D82 
and D86 are two dummy variables (the first takes the value of one in 1982
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and the second does it in 1986, zero elsewhere), which account for the 1982 
wage explosion and the 1986 incomes policy respectively.
The equations have been estimated for the period 1956-90 using pub­
lished data for Greek manufacturing (see data appendix). Instrumental 
variable estimates have been tested for possible deviations from the assumed 
statistical properties of non-autocorrelation in residuals, linearity, homoske- 
dasticity and absence of autocorrelation conditional heteroskedasticity. I 
have also tested for the existence of overidentifying restrictions in the struc­
tural form equations (see appendix for diagnostics). These Reset-type tests 
are asymptotically distributed as x2 (*) and are based on the Lagrange-multi- 
plier Principle. The F-form of the above tests is preferred as a better approxi­
mation to the corresponding x2 for small samples (see Spanos, 1986). De­
grees of freedom are corrected appropriately in each case, in order to ac­
count for the assumption of orthogonality between the residuals and the 
fitted values. Finally, I have applied two Chow tests with break points,
Table 2
2SLSQ ESTIMATES FOR EMPLOYMENT EQUATION: 1956-90
An n - k
constant -  1.31 (4.6) -  1.36 (4.2)
An_ i 0.37 (2.5) —
(w -p ) -  0.08 (1.7) -  0.11 (2.2)
SF (Pf~P) -  0.58 (2.6) -  0.88 (4.1)
P* ~P) 0.15 (1.5) 0.24 (2.3)
y 0.29 (4.6) 0.30 (4.2)












Notes: Absolute /-statistics in parentheses besides the estimates, and degrees of freedom 
besides the F-tests.
means rejection of null hypothesis at 5% s.l.
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Table 3
2SLSQ ESTIMATES FOR REAL PRODUCT WAGE (w -p) EQUATION: 1956-90
I II III IV V
const. -  3.19 (3.0) -  1.77 (2.6) -  2.47 (2.4) -  0.95 (1.3) -  1.80 (2.4)
time* 10-2 1.89 (2.6) 0.91 (1.7) 1.18 (1.6) 0.20 (0.3) 0.72 (1.2)
AApc
D 82
- — -  0.57 (2.2) -  0.47 (1.9) -  0.37 (1.6) 
0.07 (1.6)
D86 - - - - -  0.10 (2.6)
(k -n ) 1.34 (2.4) 0.64 (1.8) 1.08 (2.0) 0.31 (0.9)
( £ - « ) - 1 - - - -
0.75 (2.1)
(Pc~P) 4.26 (1.6) - 4.95 (2.0) — -
i f  (Pf-P) 
y
-  0.26 (1.6) - -  0.74 (2.1) —
0.58 (2.8) 0.33 (2.4) 0.47 (2.4) 0.20 (1.5) 0.35 (2.5)
(w -p )-  1 0.43 (4.2) 0.60 (4.2) 0.64 (3.6) 0.80 (5.0) 0.68 (4.2)
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
s 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
LM 1 3.8 2.1 4.1 1.5 3.7
LM2 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.1 2.0
LIN 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.4
MET 1.2 1.9 2.8 1.9 1.1
ARCH 1 1.1 1.3 1.9 0.1 0.1
ARCH2 1.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.1
BASM 2.1 2.1 1.7 3.1 1.4
CHOW74 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.0
CHOW67 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5
F-test for
1.5H0:P 3 = 0 4  =  0 3.5*
1967 for the first and 1974 for the second in order to test parameters 
stability across time.
Taking as initial values the 2SLSQ estimates, I proceed to a three-stage 
least squares estimation of the model. At this stage I tested for two cross 
equations restrictions accounting for the long-run K/N  ‘neutrality implied 
by the production function equation (1): t 2/ t x =  -  (1  -  Qql/oQ and /?2 =  ~  
(1 -  a x)/a2. Finally, based on these 3SLSQ estimates I applied a dynamic 
simulation exercise investigating the effect on employment and real wage of 
the temporary demand shock discussed in comparative statics of Section 2.
Thus, Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the 2SLSQ estimates of employment, 
wage and price equations respectively, Table 5 the 3SLSQ estimates re­
stricted and unrestricted, using the two alternative forms of wage setting
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Table 4
2SLSQ ESTIMATES FOR PRICE (Ap) EQUATIONS: 1957-90
I II
constant 0.33 (2.1) 0.51 (2.1)
time’ 10“ 2 -  0.83 (1.6) -  2.02 (1.6)
(time)2” 10-4 - 1.92 (1.0)
¿ P - 1 0.50 (3.3) 0.51 (3.3)
(k -n ) -  0.20 (1.6) -  0.40 (1.7)
(p -  0.93* w -  0.07>/)_, -  0.18 (1.6) -  0.20 (1.8)
R2 0.72 0.73
s 0.05 0.05









F-test for H 0: coeff (jy) =  0 0.4 1.4
specification; while Table 6 gives the results of the dynamic simulation 
exercise. 4
4. Estimation and Testing
Estimated equations exhibit remarkably high explanatory power and 
considerably small standard errors. Specification tests show that all equa­
tions are well specified. Few of the assumed optimal statistical properties 
are violated at 5%  s.l. The Basmann statistic shows that the implied overi­
dentifying restrictions can not be rejected in any of the structural form 
equations, while Chow tests can not manifest serious structural breaks a- 
cross time.
In labour demand equations the estimate of sluggishness in the ad­
justment coefficient appeared to be around 0.35, while all independent 
variables revealed a statistically significant impact on employment. Long run 
coefficients are —0.17 for real wage, — 1.3 for real oil price, and 0.37 and 
0.46 for competitiveness and demand for output respectively. Estimates on
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3SLSQ ESTIMATES OF THE MODEL
Table 5
«0 -  1.46 (5.1) -  0.57 (2.2) -  1.50 (5.3) -  1.55 (4.7)
“ 1 0.35 (2.8) 0.90 (16.) 0.33 (2.7) 0.43 (3.3)
“ 2 -  0.13 (3.1) -  0.11 (2.0) -  0.13 (3.1) -  0.19 (4.2)
«3 -  0.94 (4.9) -  0.81 (3.2) -  0.96 (5.1) -  1.11 (5.1)
«4 0.28 (3.1) 0.25 (2.1) 0.28 (3.1) 0.38 (3.7)
“ 5 0.33 (5.1) 0.13 (2.2) 0.34 (5.3) 0.35 (4.7)
fto -  1.56 (2.5) -  2.13 (3.7) -  3.77 (4.4) -  6.24 (6.5)
f t n 10"2 0.56 (1.1) 0.78 (1.7) 1.77 (3.1) 3.03 (4.1)
ft 02 -  0.26 (1.2) -  0.26 (1.7) - -
ftx 0.69 (4.9) 0.60 (4.8) 0.42 (3.3) 0.14 (0.9)
ftl 0.60 (1.9) 0.90 (RESTR) 1.67 (3.7) 2.91 (RESTR)
ft3 — - 2.83 (1.5) 7.32 (2.5)
ft* - - -  0.72 (2.2) -  1.46 (3.9)
ftl 0.31 (2.6) 0.42 (3.7) 0.71 (4.2) 1.17 (6.2)
T0 0.62 (3.2) 0.57 (2.9) 0.69 (3.5) 0.73 (3.9)
T0i* ic r 2 -  2.65 (2.6) -  1.97 (2.1) -  3.08 (3.0) -  3.49 (3.4)
t 02 10"4 2.86 (1.9) 1.43 (1.2) 3.50 (2.3) 4.28 (2.9)
t 03 0.44 (3.2) 0.41 (2.9) 0.47 (3.5) 0.51 (3.7)
*1 -  0.23 (2.2) -  0.29 (2.9) -  0.25 (2.4) -  0.23 (3.9)
t 2 -  0.50 (2.5) -  0.26 (RESTR) -  0.59 (2.8) -  0.67 (RESTR)
E’ H H 'E 45.7 27.6 37.8 49.2
Cross-eqs restrs:
X2 tt) 22.2* 11.4*
Employment eq.
Diagnostics
s 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
DW 1.84 1.50 1.85 1.81
Real Wage eq.
Diagnostics
s 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
DW 1.41 1.30 1.30 1.13
Price eq.
Diagnostics
s 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
DW 1.75 1.70 1.80 1.75
Note: Pai =  coeff (time), P02 =  coeff (AApc), r 01 =  coeff (time), z02 =  coeff (time2) and 
t03 =  coeff (A/>_ |).
the reduced sample 1974-90 showed that for recent years the speed of 
adjustment has increased while the impact of demand and real oil price rose, 
while those from real wage and competitiveness fell.
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SIMULATION EXPERIMENT





Employment Nominal Wage Output Price
1 -  0.102 2.117 1.747
2 -  0.136 0.591 0.255
3 -  0.125 0.479 0.173
4 -  0.114 0.433 0.155
5 -  0.104 0.395 0.141
6 -  0.095 0.359 0.129
7 -  0.086 0.327 0.117
8 -  0.078 0.298 0.107
9 -  0.071 0.271 0.097
10 -  0.065 0.247 0.088
11 -  0.059 0.225 0.080
12 -  0.054 0.205 0.073
13 -  0.049 0.187 0.067
14 -  0.045 0.170 0.061
15 -  0.041 0.155 0.055
16 -  0.037 0.141 0.050
17 -  0.034 0.128 0.046
18 -  0.031 0.117 0.042
19 -  0.028 0.106 0.038
20 -  0.025 0.097 0.035
21 -  0.023 0.088 0.031
22 -  0.021 0.080 0.029
23 -  0.019 0.073 0.026
24 -  0.017 0.067 0.024
25 -  0.015 0.060 0.022
Real wage adjustment appeared sluggish, especially when the price 
surprise term and the two dummy variables are included in the model. Zero 
restriction on /?„ /?4 coefficients of equation (10) is rejected at 5%  s.l. in the 
first specification, but can not be rejected when the inflation surprise term is 
included in the model, which implies non-nested specifications for the sec­
ond case. The demand effect appeared highly significant with a stable across 
specifications long-run unit coefficient. The productivity variable (k — n) 
came out with an over two long-run coefficient when terms of the wage 
bargaining specification are included but its impact appeared reduced (long- 
run coefficient around one) when those terms are excluded.
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Price equations reveal small price inertia (0.2) while past inflation has 
a significant impact on current rate of inflation. Labour productivity (k — n) 
coefficient is statistically significant as well, with a long-run effect at the 
range of 1.5.
Three-stage least squares estimates do not considerably diverge from 
those reported previously. Nevertheless, cross equations restrictions for both 
specifications are clearly rejected at 5% s.l., which confirms the indications 
we had from the 2SLSQ estimates. The non-neutrality of the capital-labour 
ratio in the long-run might remind increasing returns to scale in production.
Based on the 3SLSQ estimates of Table 5:1 specification, I proceed to 
a dynamic simulation exercise, assuming that demand for output y is shot in 
the first period by 100% and then returns to its preshock level. All vari­
ables were set to a baseline level of zero and the experiment is that demand 
is taking the value of 1 for one period. As Table 6 shows, real wage 
increases considerably from the beginning, which has a negative impact on 
employment. Thus, in the beginning they are closer to the E[ point. As 
demand retreats to its preshock level, real wage falls and employment rises 
(moving towards E {), although very gradually. This means that the wage 
setting curve shift is considerably larger than that of the employment curve. 
Hence, the model predicts that temporary positive demand shocks could 
reduce employment and rise real wages which are sluggishly returning to 
equilibrium.
Real
1) i a g r a m :
A Temporary Demand Shock
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5. Conclusions
In this paper we developed and estimated a three-equation aggregate 
macroeconomic model for Greek manufacturing. It comprises both the de­
mand and supply influences affecting employment and prices. We examined 
equations for the employment, pricing and output decisions of the firm, as 
well as for wage setting behaviour in the labour market. The equations have 
been estimated with two and three stage least squares for the period 1956- 
90 using annual published data. The estimated labour demand equations are 
consistent with this framework and generally have well defined real wage 
and demand effects. Wage equations reveal strong demand and productivity 
effects from which only the latter is influencing significantly the price set­
ting. A break to the model is coming through the rejection of the long-run 
neutrality of capital-labour ratio hypothesis, which could remind of non-con­
stant returns to scale in production.
DATA APPENDIX
N  is manufacturing employment in manhours (OECD Main Economic Indicators).
K  is capital stock in manufacturing, generated by the real manufacturing investment variable 
(OECD National Accounts, Detailed Tables), with a depreciation rate of 2% per annum. 
Y is the manufacturing output index (OECD MEI).
P is the manufacturing output price index (OECD MEI).
Pc is the wholesale price index (OECD MEI).
P* is the world manufacturing export price (UN Monthly Digest of Statistics) in domestic 
currency (OECD MEI).
Pf the oil price (IMF Internat. Financial Statistics) in domestic currency. 
tv is hourly earnings in manufacturing (OECD MEI).
Y* world exports volume in US$ terms (IMF IFS).
APPENDIX FOR DIAGNOSTICS
The diagnostic statistics are defined as follows:
R. 2  is the coefficient of determination.
s is the standard error of the regression.
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic.
E'HH'E is the minimum distance criterion in the 3SLSQ procedure.
LM (i) is the F-form of the LM test for residual autocorrelation up to i order, i  =  1,2, 
and they are based on an auxiliary regression of the residuals on i lags of the 
residuals and the fitted values of the regression.
LIN  is the F-form of the RESET test for linearity, based on an auxiliary regression of
the residuals on the level and the square of the fitted values.
HET  is the F-form of the RESET test for heteroskedasticity based on an auxiliary 
regression of the square residuals on the level and the square of the fitted values.
ARCH (/') is the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity test of Engle, order i =  1,2,
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based on an auxiliary regression of the squared residuals on lagged squared 
residuals.
BASM is the Basmann test of the overidentifying restrictions implied by the structural 
forms, based on an auxiliary regression on all the instruments.
CHOW (j) is the F-type of the Chow test for the subsample j  (/' =  1967-90, 1974-90) against 
the whole sample 1956-90.
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SALARI, PREZZI E OCCUPAZIONE NELL’INDUSTRIA MANUFATTURIE- 
RA GRECA
Questo articolo cerca di esaminare la determinazione dell’occupazione, dei 
prezzi e dei salari nell’industria manufatturiera greca. In particolare i due aspetti 
fondamentali del modello qui sviluppato sono che le imprese imperfettamente 
concorrenziali sono in grado di fissare i prezzi e che i salari non sono determinati 
dall’equilibrio del mercato del lavoro. Le equazioni stimate sembrano funzionare 
abbastanza bene con salari reali ed effetti di domanda generalmente ben definiti 
nell’equazione dell’occupazione e un considerevole impatto della produttività del 
lavoro sul salario reale e il prezzo nelle equazioni più significative. Infine, le flut­
tuazioni della produzione hanno una influenza rilevante sui salari, ma non sui 
prezzi.
